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Abstract: The Swiss commodity sector has come under increasing scrutiny in the last few years as a result of the 
substantial growth experienced by global commodity trade since 2002 and the importance of Switzerland as a 
leading international commodity trading hub. These developments have put commodity trading squarely on the 
agenda of Swiss institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Swiss academia has also started en-
gaging in the debate, but faced considerable challenges in contributing to an informed dialogue due to the overall 
paucity of data still surrounding cross-border and transit activities of Swiss-based commodity companies active in 
physical and derivatives trading, and the consequent substantial gaps in existing literature as to the impacts as-
sociated with commodity investment and trading in Switzerland and in host countries. This paper aims at identify-
ing main knowledge gaps and providing a basis for further academic research on commodity investment and 
trading, while informing current policy debates and decision-making processes in Switzerland.  
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Introduction 
Switzerland has a long history of involvement in commodity trading. In recent years, howev-
er, the Swiss commodity sector has come under increasing scrutiny, mainly because of the 
substantial growth experienced by global commodity trade since 20021 and the importance of 
Switzerland as a leading international commodity trading hub. These developments have put 
commodity trading squarely on the agenda of Swiss institutions and non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs). Swiss academia has also engaged in the debate, but faced considera-
ble challenges in contributing to an informed dialogue due to the overall paucity of data still 
surrounding cross-border and transit activities of Swiss-based commodity companies active 
in physical and derivatives trading, and the consequent substantial gaps in existing literature 
as to the financial, socio-economic, environmental and governance-related impacts associat-
ed with commodity investment and trading in Switzerland and in host countries.  
Against this backdrop, three institutions – the Centre for Development and Environment 
(CDE) and the World Trade Institute (WTI) of the University of Bern, and the Institute for 
Business Ethics (IWE) of the University of St. Gallen – have jointly taken the initiative to 
make a detailed assessment of research gaps and needs. This working paper reflects this 
effort and takes stock of the existing literature related to commodity investment and trading. 
Due account is given to those studies which either specifically focus on the Swiss commodity 
sector or address issues related to investment and trade in specific sub-sectors and/or coun-
tries of particular importance for Swiss-based commodity companies. Without making any 
claim to comprehensiveness, the paper aims at identifying main knowledge gaps and provid-
ing a basis for further academic research, while informing current policy debates and deci-
sion-making processes. The paper was written in the context of the project “Global change 
and Developing Countries: Why should we care?” managed by the Commission for Research 
Partnerships with Developing Countries (KFPE) and the Forum for Climate and Global 
Change (ProClim) under the auspices of the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences.2  
The following sections will be organized as follows. Section 1 gives an overview of the Swiss 
commodity sector. It illustrates the driving factors that contributed to making Switzerland a 
leading international commodity trading hub, and describes the structure of the sector in the 
country, the actors involved and the most relevant political initiatives currently high on the 
Swiss agenda. Section 2 gives an account of the literature on the impacts of commodity in-
vestment and trading in both host (resource-rich) countries and home countries (and Switzer-
land in particular). Section 3 identifies and discusses positive and negative socio-economic 
(i.e. livelihood), environmental and governance-related impacts resulting from both soft and 
hard commodity production in commodity-dependent developing countries (CDDCs) where 
Swiss-based companies operate based on existing research. Finally, section 4 provides an 
overview of hard law instruments and soft law initiatives aimed at mitigating or preventing the 
                                                            
1  Commodities exports (fuels as well as mining, fishery, and forestry products) grew sixfold from 1998 to 2008 
(WTO 2010, 54). Overall, “resource trade has more than tripled between 2000 and 2010, from less than $1.5 
trillion to nearly $5 trillion” (Lee et al. 2012, 4). This increase has been driven mainly by rising prices (including 
higher oil prices [Lee et al. 2012, 20]), and less by increasing quantities (WTO 2010, 56). In 2008, hard com-
modities (minerals and energy) accounted for around 20% of world trade, while soft commodities (agricultural 
products) accounted for around 8% (Ruta and Venables 2012, 3). For definitional issues see section 1.1.  
2  This paper is co-sponsored by the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences, the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDC), and the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN). The paper was discussed during 
the workshop on the topic of “Hard/Soft Commodities and Switzerland: Identifying Research Gaps” held on 21 
April 2015 at the WTI. 
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occurrence of negative impacts on human rights and on the environment of relevance for the 
commodity sector, and explores the potential of investment, trade and financial market rules 
for creating an environment conducive to sustainable commodity extraction, production, pro-
cessing and trading. Main knowledge gaps and areas of interest for future academic re-
search will be identified at the end of each section. 
1. Switzerland’s Commodity Sector 
Commodities and commodity trading have long played an important role in Switzerland due 
to two main reasons. First, Switzerland is not a resource-endowed country and therefore it 
depends on the importation of commodities for its internal consumption and production 
needs.3 Second, commodity trading has been a lucrative economic activity for Switzerland 
since the 19th century (Guex 1998; Breiding and Schwarz 2011; Swiss Federal Council 2013; 
Foraus 2014), although the Swiss trading platform has faced increased competition from 
other market places4.  
Despite the economic importance of commodities and commodity trading for Switzerland, 
few studies have analysed the phenomenon in a comprehensive way (Guex 1998, 151). This 
section aims at providing an overview of the Swiss commodity sector. After addressing some 
preliminary definitional issues, it first illustrates the driving factors that contributed to making 
Switzerland a leading international commodity trading hub and the main historical phases 
marking the development of the sector. Second, it gives an account of the prominence of 
commodity trading in Switzerland today based on publicly available data. Third, it describes 
the actors involved in commodity trading in Switzerland. This is followed by an analysis of the 
most significant political initiatives currently high on the Swiss agenda. Finally, the section 
identifies main knowledge gaps and provides some suggestions as to which direction to pur-
sue in future research.  
1.1 Preliminary definitional issues 
In this study, the term ‘commodities’ is used to indicate those natural resources that are ho-
mogeneous and can therefore be subject to centralized trading with a unified price (WTO 
2010, 59). Conventionally, commodities are classified into two main categories: hard and soft 
commodities (UNCTAD 2012, xi). Hard commodities are mined or extracted; they include 
non-renewable resources such as energy commodities (e.g. oil, gas, coal), metals and other 
mineral products (e.g. iron, aluminium, copper, gold, and diamonds). Soft commodities are 
cultivated, and therefore consist of renewable resources such as non-processed agricultural 
products (e.g. sugar, corn, and wheat).  
In commodity trading, physical commodity trading is commonly distinguished from derivatives 
trading (Swiss Bankers Association 2013). Physical commodity trading connects the produc-
                                                            
3  Switzerland’s reliance on commodities imports is transversal, ranging from agricultural commodities to mineral 
(e.g. precious and non-precious metals) and energy (e.g. oil and gas) commodities. In the latter case, import 
dependence is absolute, as Switzerland has neither mineral nor energy resources. In the case of the agricul-
tural sector, domestic production is overall insufficient to meet internal demand (see Annex 1). 
4  Competing market places are spread across Europe, Asia, and North America. Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and 
Houston are important commodity hub thanks to their large ports and extensive commodity depots. Chicago 
and Hong Kong have leading commodity stock exchanges. New York, London, and Shanghai are competing 
financial hubs (Erklärung von Bern 2011, 36). According to the recent Swiss Background Report (Swiss Fed-
eral Council 2013, 13) Singapore, Dubai, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands are 
Switzerland’s main competitors in this field. 
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er with the consumer and fills the gap between supply and demand. Physical traders provide 
a range of services between two physical locations: the production site and the consumption 
site. Typical services include transportation, financing, contracting, and insurance. Deriva-
tives trading, in contrast, consists mainly of financial activities. Derivatives traders use finan-
cial instruments to hedge risks and make investments that leverage fluctuations in commodi-
ty prices. They do not deal with physical commodities, but they buy and sell contracts (Swiss 
Bankers Association 2013, 6). According to the Swiss Bankers Association, the proportion of 
commodity derivatives in relation to overall derivatives traded only amounts to 3% (Swiss 
Bankers Association 2013, 10).5 
An additional classification in commodity trading differentiates between cross-border trading 
and transit trading. In cross-border trading, the transaction occurs from a seller abroad and a 
buyer in Switzerland. The object of the transaction thus actually crosses Swiss borders and 
can be used domestically. Transit trading (also known as merchanting), in contrast, occurs 
‘offshore’, with a merchanting company buying from a supplier abroad and selling to a buyer 
who is also abroad. Merchanting is generally more common in commodity trading, so that 
“merchanting and commodity trading are often used as synonyms” (Beusch et al. 2013, 2). 
Transit trading can be both in physical commodities and in derivatives but the former is by far 
more predominant (Swiss Bankers Association 2013, 10-11). In this case, the purchased 
commodities never physically touch the ground of the merchanting company’s country of 
residence (in our case, Switzerland) and are not transformed, although the company owns 
them from the moment it buys them until the moment it sells them. Transit trading plays a 
central role in the Swiss commodity sector. According to the Swiss National Bank (SNB), in 
2009 94% of Swiss transit trading concerned commodities (EvB 2011). 
1.2 The structure of the Swiss commodity sector 
 Historical overview  1.2.1
Switzerland is a landlocked country with no significant natural resources. Since the 19th cen-
tury, however, it has developed into one of the world’s most important commodity trading 
hubs. Existing academic studies, although still scarce, concur that Switzerland’s long-
standing economic and political stability, along with a number of factors related to the evolu-
tion of Swiss trading companies, have contributed to shaping the structure of the sector as it 
is now and to strengthening its economic importance in the country. Guex (1998) lists several 
reasons for this ‘success story’, namely established political neutrality, military non-
participation in the two world wars, a strong currency, a tax system that favoured the estab-
lishment of trading companies by allowing for ‘ring fencing’ and, most importantly, the exist-
ence of relationship networks (ibid., 150). Along the same lines, Breiding and Schwarz 
(2011) emphasize the role of relationship networks, tracing trading companies’ origins back 
to the 15th century, when large numbers of Swiss mercenaries started serving the superpow-
ers of the time – Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands – up to the 18th century (ibid., 
264). Over time, these mercenaries built a network of contacts across European countries, 
which helped establish flourishing cross-border businesses. Moreover, such networks kept 
growing as Swiss economic migrants founded colonial settlements overseas that later served 
as small hubs for Swiss trading companies (ibid., 265-266).  
                                                            
5  Commodity traders are of minimal importance in the derivatives market, as 93% of derivatives trading is based 
on interest rates and currencies (Swiss Bankers Association 2013, 11). 
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According to Guex (1998, 152-153), two historical phases marked a decisive step towards 
the development of commodity trading in Switzerland: the second half of the 19th century and 
the decade following the end of World War II. The 19th century saw the establishment of so-
called traditional Swiss trading companies, founded by entrepreneurial individuals discover-
ing new markets (Breiding and Schwarz 2011, 266-275). Companies like Basler Mission and 
pioneers like the Volkart brothers, Caspar Brennwald, Hermann Siber, Wilhelm Heinrich Di-
ethelm, Anton Keller, and Johann Caspar Reinhart took advantage of favourable trading 
conditions in the mid-1800s to start a fast-growing business: they imported raw materials 
such as cotton, coffee, tea, cocoa, rubber, vegetable oils, and others from Africa, India, and 
Asia to Switzerland, and they exported Swiss manufactured goods (Breiding and Schwarz 
2011, ibid.). Most of these traditional trading houses, however, were not able to establish 
themselves in modern international commodity trade.6  
At the beginning of the 20th century, Switzerland gradually became an important financial 
centre and began to provide financial services related to physical commodity trading. The 
expansion of the sector continued irrespective of the outbreak of the World War I thanks to 
Swiss political neutrality: Swiss insurance companies and banks kept growing and developed 
into an important sector of the Swiss economy (Guex 1998, 154). Commodity trade, only 
marginally affected by the war, continued to expand at significant rates throughout the 1920s 
(ibid.). As a result, Switzerland became a major commodity trading centre during this period, 
especially for soft commodities (Swiss Bankers Association 2013). Foreign companies 
moved their headquarters to Switzerland or opened Swiss subsidiaries or branches. The 
most prominent example is the French Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS), who moved 
to Switzerland in 1915.7 The commodity trading sector grew significantly in the 1920s, and by 
1928 Swiss trading companies’ total turnover amounted to 11.9% of the Swiss gross national 
product (GNP) (Guex 1998, 153-154). 
However, the commodity sector was profoundly affected by the economic crisis in the 1930s 
and started recovering only after World War II (ibid.). The late 1940s and 1950s saw the 
emergence of new companies, and foreign companies established a commercial presence in 
Switzerland. Many companies settled in the Geneva region, further developing the commodi-
ty sector (Swiss Bankers Association 2013, 12). According to Leimgruber (2013), Switzerland 
introduced tax incentives for multinational companies, attracting over 300 US companies 
between 1956 and 1961 (among them, Philipp Brothers in 1956). Trading companies’ annual 
revenues increased, and by 1953 the sector’s contribution to Swiss GNP was back to 1928 
levels (Guex 1998, 156). The increasing importance of oil marked a new phase in the expan-
sion of the commodity (and financial) sector in the 1970s (Swiss Bankers Association 2013, 
12). The end of the Cold War further contributed to foster growth as a result of increased 
trade with Russia and Russian traders (ibid.).  
The above factors explain how the Swiss trading sector evolved and how it acquired its con-
siderable importance. The sector has undergone considerable change since its beginnings. 
Today, commodity trade is dominated by different companies and by a diverse set of com-
modities: oil, minerals, and agricultural products. Many of these commodities are used in 
industrial production and/or fed into global production networks (Breiding and Schwarz 2011, 
275). The associated companies established their presence in Switzerland fairly recently, 
                                                            
6  Some of these firms disappeared from the market (e.g. André Cie), others reinvented themselves by offering 
complementary services (e.g. DKSH). There are some exceptions of traditional trading houses still operative 
today, for instance the Volkart Group and Paul Reinhart AG (Breiding and Schwarz 2011, 276)  
7  SGS is the biggest certification and inspection company worldwide in commodity trading (Swiss Federal Coun-
cil 2013, 7). 
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starting from the 1970s (ibid., 277). Among them are, inter alia, Stemcor Europe AG, 
Petroplus Holding AG, Vitol, and the Gunvor Group (ibid., 280). 
Historical analyses of Switzerland as a commodity trading centre are generally scarce (Guex 
1998, 151). Several historical studies have focused on the infant stages of the Swiss com-
modity sector, investigating in particular the development of traditional trading houses. While 
there have been a number of journalistic investigations into Swiss commodity trading in the 
20th century, academic literature is limited. 
 Physical commodity trading in Switzerland  1.2.2
This section gives an account of the economic dimension of the commodity sector in Switzer-
land, both at an aggregate level and for single commodities. In particular, it focuses on phys-
ical commodity trading in Switzerland and distinguishes, to the maximum extent possible, 
what constitutes cross-border trading for domestic use and what constitutes transit trading. 
As will be shown, however, currently available data are highly fragmented and incomplete. 
The same holds true for the information concerning taxes and trade measures applied to 
commodities.  
Switzerland ranks 17th among the world’s largest importers of resources, with a share of 
1.6% of the total value of global imports (Lee et al. 2012, 146, 160). Commodities account for 
26% of Switzerland’s total imports (Schweizerische Nationalbank 2013, 10). Exports of 
commodities, in contrast, are relatively limited (see Annex 1). The few commodities that 
Switzerland exports in notable quantities are soft commodities such as coffee, cocoa, sugar, 
and cereals and, among hard commodities, gold.  
Significantly, a substantial share of Swiss physical commodity trading consists of transit trad-
ing Transit trading is reflected in Switzerland’s balance of payment statistics as an export of 
services (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 8). Commodity trading accounts for 94% of Swiss 
transit trading, with energy, metals and agricultural commodities accounting for, respectively, 
59%, 20%, and 15% (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 7).  
In 2011, the total turnover of companies involved in commodity transit trading was around 
130% of the Swiss gross domestic product (GDP) (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 7). The 
commodity transit trading sector was estimated to account for 3.6% of Swiss gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2010 (creating a value added of around CHF 18 billion) by the Swiss Bank-
ers Association (Swiss Bankers Association 2013, 13) and for 3.4% of Swiss GDP in 2011 by 
the Swiss Federal Council (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 8). Transit trading as such has been 
growing constantly over the last decades, with revenues increasing from CHF 2 billion in 
2003 to CHF 20 billion in 2011 (Schweizerische Nationalbank 2013, 17). These revenues 
are, however, subject to high price fluctuations and volatility (ibid.); in 2012, for example, they 
decreased to CHF 19 billion (Schweizerische Nationalbank 2013, 17). Overall, Swiss transit 
trading increased exponentially at the beginning of the 21th century, with an estimated tenfold 
growth (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 9; EvB 2011, 39). 
Compared to cross-border trading, transit trading in Switzerland appears to be much more 
conspicuous in value and volume. The same holds true if one compares transit trading to 
domestic consumption (EvB 2011, 38). According to EvB, Switzerland is a global leader in 
transit trading, accounting for a share of 15% to 25% of world transit trading in commodities 
(EvB 2011, 39). Currently, however, information about transit trading in Switzerland can be 
obtained almost exclusively from studies produced by NGOs (see e.g. EvB 2011; Multiwatch 
2014; Gillies, Guéniat and Kummer 2014; Cobham et al. 2013, 2014), think-tanks (see e.g. 
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Lee et al. 2012; Lein, de Roquefeuil, and van Seters. 2014; Foraus 2014) and industry asso-
ciations (Swiss Bankers Association 2013). Yet, academic research on transit trading is al-
most nil. Lack of independent surveys has determined substantial knowledge gaps, particu-
larly with respect to what are the market shares of different players at the national level as 
well as for specific enterprises. The Swiss government could play an invaluable role in 
providing more comprehensive official statistics and assembled data in view of facilitating 
research.  
Moreover, information concerning single commodities is often fragmented, and frequently 
focused on cross-border physical trading. Annex 1 compiles available commodity-specific 
data taking account of Swiss physical cross-border commodity trading. To the maximum ex-
tent possible, it distinguishes among different processing stages per category, although it is 
sometimes difficult to find sufficiently disaggregated data. Data reported in Annex 1 are 
sourced from various annual reports of sectoral associations, commodity-specific umbrella 
organizations, and public databases. The multiplicity of sources notwithstanding, information 
is frequently incomplete or missing. 
Systematic information on tax revenues from the commodity sector is not available; there are 
only rough estimates (Swiss Federal Council Report, 10; Foraus 2014, 13). Annex 1 lists 
information suggesting that fiscal revenues from sales of crude oil products in 2013 amount-
ed to CHF 6.37 billion, which corresponds to 4.7% of total federal fiscal revenues (Erdöl-
Vereinigung 2015, 18). More information is needed to map the commodity sector’s relevance 
for Swiss tax revenues, and the extent to which Switzerland’s current tax regulation enables 
public review must be assessed as well. Information is also missing for figures regarding 
employment provided by the commodity sector (see sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
Data on trade measures affecting Swiss physical commodity trading still need to be assem-
bled. Trade in commodities, either in their raw state or processed, is overall affected by a 
wide range of trade measures, including tariffs, quantitative restrictions, subsidies, and other 
non-tariff measures, with the selection of trade measures varying greatly depending on the 
commodity in question (WTO 2010, 114). Trade protection tends to be lower for raw com-
modities and usually increases with the degree of processing of the goods in question (so-
called tariff escalation) (ibid.). Tariffs imposed on hard commodities tend to be lower than 
those on soft commodities (ibid.). Non-tariff measures, including subsidies, tend to be lower 
for fuel and mining products than for agricultural and fishery products (ibid.). In contrast, ex-
port taxes are higher and more frequent for commodities compared to processed products 
(WTO 2010, 115-116). The use of export taxes is typical of the commodity sector (ibid., 125) 
and has increased in the last few years (Espa, 2015). Switzerland is an exception in this re-
gard, as it generally imposes no export duties (OECD 2014). 
Publicly available data confirm the existence of tariff escalation in Switzerland (see Box 1). 
This means that tariffs on raw materials are lower than on processed products, with some 
exceptions due to preferences conferred to least developed countries (LDCs). While public 
data are available, the phenomenon of tariff escalation in Switzerland has not been system-
atically investigated so far, and neither has the question of whether and to which extent 
standards are applied as non-tariff barriers (Häberli 2008). Prospective research should fo-
cus on this relevant topic as well, as it is closely linked to the phenomenon of commodity 
dependence (see section 2.3.3). 
Overall, more analysis is also needed in the field of trade measures. Although the WTO 
Trade Policy Reviews provide an overview of the measures affecting imports and exports 
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applied by Switzerland and other WTO Members, also at a sectorial level, information is not 
always consistent and detailed, with the quality varying greatly across countries.8 Future re-
search should also assess the impact of trade measures applied to commodities, by Switzer-
land as well as by its partners, on the Swiss economy. Moreover, inasmuch as trade in 
commodities is subject to a patchwork of domestic, bilateral, and multilateral trade disci-
plines, it would be useful to undertake a mapping exercise in order to identify what disciplines 
are already in place and any relevant gaps and shortcomings, especially with respect to the 
need to promote sustainable trade in commodities.  
In conclusion, information on physical commodity trading in Switzerland is not comprehen-
sive and several areas are yet to be fully explored. There is a particular need for systemati-
cally collecting and assembling information that distinguishes between physical cross-border 
trading and transit trading and between different types of commodities. The Swiss govern-
ment could play a key role in this respect.  
                                                            
8  The Trade Policy Reviews are periodic reviews conducted by the WTO Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) in 
order to closely monitor the trade policies and practices of each WTO Member. The frequency of the reviews 
varies according to each country’s share of world trade (WTO, 2015).  
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Box 1: Specific Commodities (see also Annex 1) 
This box compiles some Swiss-related data on specific types of commodities. The available information is gen-
erally incomplete. Gaps include import and export data for certain commodities, particularly base metals and 
coal.  
Hard commodities 
Switzerland hosts key oil trading hubs. One third of the total volume of globally traded oil products is exchanged 
in Geneva, with minor trading activities outside the Lake Geneva region (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 11-12). 
According to a study commissioned by several NGOs (Gillies, Guéniat and Kummer 2014), Swiss trading com-
panies dominate trade in oil originating from African countries. According to Gillies et al., from 2011 to 2013 they 
purchased about 25% of the oil sold by African state-owned companies, contributing significantly to African gov-
ernments’ revenues (Gillies, Guéniat and Kummer 2014). These data appear to refer to transit trade. 
Compared to transit trade, physical cross-border trading of oil is much less important. In 2013, Switzerland im-
ported 12.43 million tonnes of oil products at a value of CHF 10.78 billion.9 Two thirds of oil imports arriving in 
Switzerland originate in African countries, including Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt; one third originates in 
Kazakhstan (Erdöl-Vereinigung 2015).  
Gas is not widely traded in Switzerland. However, companies headquartered in Zug are active in building and 
running gas pipelines (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 12). The amount of gas imported to Switzerland in 2013 
corresponds to 39.8 terawatt-hours at a value of USD 373 million (see Annex 1)10  
Lugano has relevant coal trading activities (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 12). However, data on coal imports are 
missing. 
Two thirds of the international trade in base metals takes place in Switzerland (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 11). 
Companies from Zug are important players in trading copper and zinc. They are widely active in the extraction of 
base metals (iron, aluminium, nickel, and palladium). Lugano is a relevant trading centre for steel as well as 
other base metals (ibid.). This information, however, appears to relate to transit trading. Figures on base metal 
imports are difficult to obtain. 
Swiss-based companies hold a strong position in global gold trade. The largest bilateral gold trade relations by 
value are maintained with India, USA, Peru, and Thailand (Lee et al. 2012). Gold refineries play a key role and 
are mainly headquartered in the Canton of Ticino (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 11). According to journalistic 
information, 70% of world gold is refined in Switzerland (Mariani 2012), three of the biggest refineries are located 
in Ticino and another large refinery is located in Neuchâtel (ibid.). 
The example of gold illustrates how politically sensitive the disclosure of trade data may be. Official statistics 
concerning gold and silver trade occurring in the past decades were only recently published by the Swiss Cus-
toms Administration (2015c). The available data for ‘precious metals’ (gold, silver, and platinum) trade suggests 
that, in 2011, Switzerland imported precious metals for a value of approximately CHF 100 billion and exported 
precious metals for a value of CHF 80 million (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 9). According to the new accessible 
database, in 2013 gold imports amounted to 3.1 tonnes for a value of CHF 109.8 billion and gold exports 
amounted to 2.8 tonnes for a value of CHF 117.7 billion. In the same year, Switzerland imported 1.8 tonnes of 
silver for a value of CHF 1.4 billion, while exports amounted to 2.4 tonnes for a value of CHF 1.7 billion. Tariff 
escalation seems to be imposed on gold products (Swiss Customs Administration 2015b). 
Altogether, Switzerland is an important importer of mining products (including metallic and non-metallic ores and 
                                                            
9  As a comparison, the global crude oil production in 2013 amounted to 68.6 million barrels per day (IEA 2014, 
115), corresponding to CHF 3.4 trillion per year. 
10  This number refers to the amount of natural gas imported to Switzerland for domestic use. The average natural 
gas price in 2013 amounted to USD 2.75 per mmBTU (million British thermal units) (data from 
www.nasdaq.com). With 1 mmBTU corresponding to 3,412,142 terawatt-hours (TWh), 39.8 TWh corresponds 
to 135,803,237 mmBTU. The equivalent value of 39.8 TWh is therefore 373 million USD. 
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their metals). Globally, 1.5% of total mineral imports are directed to Switzerland, amounting to a value of USD 
8.1 billion (WTO 2010, 216). Critical raw materials11 are a debated topic in Switzerland (Kohl 2010). We found no 
in-depth academic studies on Swiss trade in critical raw materials. 
Soft commodities 
Cross-border trading in raw and processed cocoa is of considerable importance for the Swiss economy. In 2013, 
Switzerland imported 40,900 tonnes of cocoa at a value of CHF 119 million, and exported 109,662 tonnes of 
processed cocoa at a value of CHF 792 million. Switzerland is a net importer of cocoa beans and a net exporter 
of processed products. This pattern follows an economic model which promotes generation of value added in 
Switzerland, and which is also supported by the current tariff structure. Tariff escalation for cocoa is substantial: 
imports of cocoa beans (raw or toasted) are not subject to any tariff, while imports of processed chocolate (cocoa 
powder, chocolate blocks, slabs, and bars) are subject to tariffs varying between CHF 14.80 and CHF 669.50 per 
100 kg (Swiss Customs Administration 2015b), with some exceptions. Regarding transit trade in cocoa, infor-
mation is difficult to find. 
More than half of international trade in coffee goes through Switzerland (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 11). These 
data refer to transit trading. Yet, cross-border trading of coffee is important as well: in 2013, Switzerland exported 
131,000 tonnes of coffee at a value of CHF 660 million and imported 131,000 tonnes of unroasted coffee at a 
value of CHF 500 million (Swiss-Impex 2013). The tariff structure for coffee imports suggests that tariffs escalate, 
similarly to those on cocoa products: Switzerland imposes no tariff on unroasted coffee while imports of roasted 
coffee are subject to a normal tariff of CHF 63 per 100 kg (Swiss Customs Administration 2015b). 
As to sugar, Switzerland is an important producer and it is basically self-sufficient. Domestic production mainly 
derives from sugar beet. In 2013, Switzerland produced 217,155 tonnes of sugar domestically, whereas it im-
ported 149,875 tonnes (Schweizer Zucker AG 2015). Data on sugar exports are difficult to obtain. Transit trade in 
sugar is significant: Switzerland (particularly, the Geneva financial hub) accounts for 50% of total international 
trade in sugar (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 11).  
Two thirds of global cereals trade is based in Switzerland, especially in Geneva. This figure relates largely to 
transit trading. Regarding cross-border trading, exports of cereals in 2013 amounted to 784,000 tonnes, corre-
sponding to a value of CHF 326 million. Imports of cereals in 2013 amounted to 17,100 kilotonnes at a value of 
CHF 2.80 million. Quotas are imposed on sugar imports from developing countries (Swiss Customs Administra-
tion 2015a). 
Switzerland, with the Lake Geneva region, is the world leader in transit trading of cotton (Swiss Federal Council 
2013, 12). More detailed data are not publicly available or are difficult to obtain. Switzerland is a net importer of 
cotton: in 2013, it imported 1.4 kilotonnes of cotton at a value of CHF 2.6 million, while it exported only 315 kg of 
cotton linters at a value of CHF 3,057 (see Annex 1). 
 Actors of the corporate segment 1.2.3
Two types of entities are active in the Swiss financial hub: (1) companies established in Swit-
zerland, and (2) companies with branches or subsidiaries in Switzerland (Guex 1998). Com-
panies operating in Switzerland differ widely as to their level of vertical integration. Among 
Swiss companies, we find all levels of vertical integration. Some are more or less fully verti-
cally integrated companies. This means that they control different stages of the supply chain. 
In the case of hard commodities, for instance, this would embrace value chain activities go-
ing from extraction to trade, including shipping, transportation, and refinement. Other compa-
nies focus on specific activities along the supply chain. Most Swiss companies focus on 
shipping and trading (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 11).  
Swiss commodity trading is concentrated in three locations: Geneva, Zug, and Lugano. Ge-
neva’s main activities are financing, banking, shipping, and product testing. The main com-
                                                            
11  Critical raw materials are essential industrial raw materials which share a number of common characteristics, 
namely economic importance, supply risk, geographical concentration, low substitutability prospects and recy-
cling rates. 
10 
 
modities traded are oil, coffee, sugar, grain, oilseed, and cotton. Dominant companies in the 
Geneva trading hub include Vitol, Trafigura, Gunvor, Litasco and Mercuria for oil, and Louis 
Dreyfus, United Coffee and Cargill for agricultural commodities (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 
11). Zug specializes in services provision and business consulting, with a substantial concen-
tration on metals (copper, zinc, aluminium, nickel, and palladium) and energy commodities 
(coal, natural gas, and, to a lesser extent, oil). The Zug trading hub is dominated by the mul-
tinational Glencore, a vertically integrated company which trades oil, metals, and agricultural 
commodities. Other examples are the Stemcor Group and Transocean. Lugano specializes 
in base metals (iron, steel) and coal, as well as in the refinement of gold (Swiss Federal 
Council 2013, 12). Two major companies in Lugano’s commodity hub are Duferco and 
Petraco (LCTA 2013). 
It remains difficult to estimate how many companies are active in Switzerland in the commod-
ity sector and it is not always clear whether they operate on either cross-border or transit 
trading, or both. The commercial register lists 90 companies active in transit trading (Swiss 
Federal Council 2013, 9) although in the case of commodity transit trading the numbers are 
probably considerably higher.12 The Swiss Bankers Association estimated that around 570 
companies with 10,500 employees were active in commodity trading in Switzerland in 2010 
(Swiss Bankers Association 2013, 13). With 400 companies and 8,000–9,000 employees, 
the Lake Geneva region is the largest commodity trading hub. Zug, hosting 100 companies 
with 2,000 employees, is the second-biggest cluster; and Lugano, with 70 companies and 
1,000 employees, ranks third (Swiss Bankers Association 2013, 13). The number of mem-
bers registered under sectoral umbrella organizations provides yet another set of figures: the 
Geneva Trading and Shipping Association (GTSA) lists 150 members (GTSA 2015), and the 
Lugano Commodity Trading Association (LCTA) lists around 40 members (LCTA 2015). In-
formation about members of the Zug Commodity Association (ZCA) was not accessible. The 
main political actors engaging in commodity-related policymaking are listed in Annex 2. This 
list is not exhaustive; this illustrates once again the urgent need for improved and consistent 
databases.  
 Political initiatives 1.2.4
Swiss political activities related to the commodity sector have multiplied over the past few 
years, especially since the release of a seminal book on the Swiss commodity market by a 
Swiss NGO in 2011 (EvB 2011). Some proposals address specifically the commodity sector 
and are meant to regulate it; others are actions pursued on broader policy areas which none-
theless affect the commodity sector. The 2013 Background Report on Commodities to the 
Swiss Federal Council lists 38 political proposals and requests, including parliamentary inter-
ventions launched by various commissions and individual members of the Swiss Parliament 
between 2002 and 2012 (Swiss Federal Council, 2013). They cover a wide range of issues, 
including human rights, transparency needs, corruption, money-laundering, tax issues, and 
environmental degradation. A number of actions have also been launched since 2013. The 
most significant are listed in Annex 3. They include initiatives taken by the federal Parliament 
and the federal administration.  
                                                            
12  In Switzerland, companies are not obliged to register their transit trading activities into the commercial register. 
Data on transit trading derive from recurrent surveys of the Swiss National Bank (Swiss Federal Council 2013, 
9). Since the companies responding to the survey are only a sample of the total active companies, we can as-
sume that 90 commodity transit trading companies is an underestimation.  
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A key contribution addressing the question of how to go forward in the regulation of the 
Swiss commodity sector is the 2013 Background Report of the Interdepartmental Platform on 
Commodities to the Federal Council. The Report presents 17 recommendations on issues 
such as transparency, corporate and government responsibility, development policy, double 
taxation agreements and transfer pricing, and reputational risks (Swiss Federal Council 
2013). The implementation of the recommendations is assessed on a yearly basis. A first 
follow-up Report was published in 2014 (Swiss Federal Council 2014a; see also section 4); a 
next report is expected to be released in August 2015. At least five departments of the feder-
al administration are involved in issues related to commodities. Box 2 describes the most 
cutting-edge and sensitive items currently on the top of the Swiss political agenda and identi-
fies relevant research gaps for each of the topics discussed. Overall, Swiss civil society ad-
vocates more regulation and several NGOs support the adoption of legally binding regula-
tions (Box 2). Yet, Swiss institutions have not always kept the pace (see Annex 3). The dis-
cussion is made more difficult by patchy knowledge and data. The scientific community can 
therefore play a key role in shedding light on the issues discussed.  
 
Box 2: Main items on the Swiss political agenda and research gaps 
Based on the recommendations to the Federal Council in the 2013 Background Report on Commodities and in 
response to various political proposals and requests at the national level, as well as to recent developments and 
debates in according international standard-setting institutions, the Swiss Government is involved in several 
political activities – including legislative – with direct or indirect implications for the commodity and commodity-
trading sectors. Most importantly, respective activities focus on: 1) a revision of the Swiss corporate tax law; 
2) the fight against illicit financial flows, especially in form of money laundering, corruption and tax avoidance; 
3) improving transparency for payments of multinational companies in extractive industries to foreign govern-
ments and state-owned enterprises; 4) strengthening due diligence requirements for multinational companies, 
including in the commodity sector; 5) introducing and enhancing the automatic exchange of information with 
other countries in tax-related issues; and 6) environmental responsibilities of the raw material sector (see Swiss 
Federal Council 2013; 2014). This box gives a rough overview on important activities and developments in these 
fields, without any claim to completeness.  
1)  Corporate tax law 
In the context of bilateral talks with the European Union and other countries on inconsistencies in their corporate 
tax regimes, the Federal Council suggested several reforms of the Swiss corporate taxation system. In June 
2015, the Federal Council adopted the dispatch on the Corporate Tax Reform Act III, which is now to be deliber-
ated by the parliamentary chambers.13 In the dispatch, the Federal Council particularly suggests the abolition of 
the cantonal tax statuses for holding companies and other corporate forms which are no longer deemed compat-
ible with according international standards. In return, the cantons shall have the possibility for treating revenue 
from patents and similar rights associated with research and development in a preferential way, as well as for 
envisaging increased deductions for research and development expenditure. The reform can have implications 
for the extractive industries and commodity sector as Swiss corporations (or multinational corporations domiciled 
in Switzerland) active in this field currently often fall under cantonal tax statuses.  
2) Illicit financial flows 
Legislative activities in Switzerland in the field of illicit financial flows14 focus on money laundering and corruption, 
in particular. In December 2014, the Federal Act for Implementing the Revised Financial Action Task Force 
                                                            
13  For more information and access to related documents, see http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/ 
medieninformationen/00467/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=57551 (accessed 8 July 2015). 
14  The OECD defines illicit financial flows as encompassing any “illegal transactions that are prohibited under the 
legal systems of the country of origin and the destination country, or that are improperly accounted for in the 
case of internal transactions within a company” (OECD 2013). The term thus includes a number of practices, 
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(FATF) Recommendations of 2012 was adopted by the Parliament. FATF is an inter-governmental standard-
setting body that promotes the implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures in the combat 
against money laundering and other threats to the integrity of the international financial system. With their rec-
ommendations, which have been issued in 1990 and last revised in 2012, FATF aims for a coordinated response 
to money laundering and other threats, and sets a basis for a level-playing field (see section 4.2.2.d). The Feder-
al Act of December 2014 introduces enhancements or amendments in eight areas, including improved transpar-
ency requirements for legal entities and more stringent obligations for financial intermediaries when identifying 
the beneficial owners of legal entities.15 Respective provisions may also affect the extractive industries and 
commodity-trading sector. In the fight against corruption, including in the commodity sector, Switzerland has 
established a legal framework by ratifying the three main international agreements currently in force16 and is 
regularly evaluated by peer review (Swiss Federal Council 2014a, 8). 
3) Transparency  
In accordance with recommendation 8 of the Background Report on Commodities and in response to a postulate 
by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council asking for more transparency in the Swiss commodity 
sector (Postulate 13.3365), the Federal Council adopted a report in June 2014, in which transparency regulations 
with respect to the commodity sector of different jurisdictions (including the European Union, the United States 
and Canada) are compared and implications of according future regulations in Switzerland are analysed (Swiss 
Federal Council 2014b). In the report, the Federal Council recommended the adjustment of Swiss transparency 
regulations to EU and US standards. A respective proposal was submitted for consultation in November 2014. 
According to the proposal, listed and large companies that are active in extractive industries are obliged to de-
clare all payments they make to governments. The proposed provisions provide for an empowerment of the 
Federal Council to expand the scope of the transparency regulations so as to include commodity trading compa-
nies if this adjustment is in line with developments in other jurisdictions, especially the European Union and the 
United States, and, therefore, corresponds to an internationally coordinated approach.17 The deadline for consul-
tation of the proposal ended in March 2015.  
4) Due diligence requirements for multinational companies and the state 
Recent developments at the international level pushed countries for progress in the protection of human rights 
(and the environment) from negative impacts of business activities, including abroad: In 2011 John Ruggie, the 
UN Special Representative on Issues of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, and Other Business Enter-
prises, presented the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, in which he highlighted that companies 
should fulfill social expectations and therefore respect human rights and environmental standards even if they 
are not legally binding for them. The Framework paved the way to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (see section 4.2.1). In Switzerland, the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles was urged in 
Postulate 12.3503 “Eine Ruggie-Strategie für die Schweiz” (Swiss Federal Council 2013). Recommendation 10 
of the Background Report on Commodities reiterates the need to identify measures needed for implementing the 
UN Guiding Principles (Swiss Federal Council 2013; 2014a). A Swiss Action Plan (2015-2017) for the implemen-
tation of the UN Guiding Principles is currently in elaboration, to be approved by the Government by the end of 
2015. The Action Plan specifically focuses on the state duty to protect and presents ways to minimize the risks 
linked to activities of Swiss companies operating abroad (Swiss Federal Council 2015b). The measures are 
voluntary and based on a “smart-mix concept”. A multi-stakeholder dialogue envisaging the participation of rep-
resentatives from the civil society, private companies, the federal administration and academia was developed in 
the elaboration phase of the document and will serve as a permanent dialogue platform also in the future (ibid.).  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
including abusive transfer pricing between subsidiaries of the same group for tax avoidance purposes, tax 
evasion and manipulative trade mispricing (ibid.). Depending on the definition, the term might also include ac-
tivities that are not illegal in the strict sense, but nevertheless problematic on the sense that vast outflows of 
money are relocated from developing countries to low-tax locations in OECD countries, thus frustrating public 
development aid funding and compromising development perspectives (Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation 2014). 
15  See https://www.sif.admin.ch/sif/en/home/dokumentation/finweb/regulierungsprojekte/umsetzung-der-2012-
revidierten-empfehlungen-gegen-geldwaescherei.html (accessed 8 July 2015). 
16  The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
in 2000, the GRECO Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in 2006, and the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption in 2009. 
17  See http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/aktuell/news/2014/2014-11-28.html (accessed 8 July 2015). 
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According to a postulate by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council of States (Postulate 14.3663), the 
Swiss Action Plan’s particular focus on the state duty to protect shall be supplemented by an analysis on access 
of victims of human rights infringements in host countries to existing judicial and non-judicial remedies in different 
home countries.  
With regard to due diligence requirements for multinational companies, the Federal Council adopted a position 
paper on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in April 2015.18 The paper enumerates four key strategies for the 
dissemination and enhancement of CSR principles and standards: (i) promotion of transparency; (ii) active partic-
ipation in international organizations and fora in the creation, re-elaboration, and development of CSR-
frameworks; (iii) CSR awareness raising among Swiss companies; and (iv) support of CSR standards in develop-
ing and transition countries (Swiss Federal Council 2015a, 4). An Action Plan for the period 2015-2019 substan-
tiates the strategies and proposes a set of ten concrete measures. The CSR position paper raised a fierce de-
bate in the civil society and among private companies, whose positions are widely divergent. 
In its Recommendation 11, the Background Report advocates the creation of a working group with representa-
tives of all different stakeholder groups involved, to elaborate concrete proposals of CSR standards for the com-
modity sector. Accordingly, and also in response to Interpellation 13.3423 to the Parliament (see annex 3), the 
Swiss Government has opened a dialogue between the civil society, the private sector, the federal administration 
and academia in order to create specific implementation mechanisms of CSR standards. 
In May 2014, the Federal Council adopted a report containing a comparative legal study on due diligence re-
quirements of Swiss companies with regard to human rights and the environment, especially with respect to their 
activities abroad. The report was issued in response of Postulate 12.3980 by the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the National Council and lists a number of measures that Switzerland might adopt in order to request private 
corporations and business organizations to respect CSR principles on, among others, human rights and sustain-
able development (Swiss Federal Council 2014c).  
In September 2014, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council submitted a proposal to the parliament 
in which the Federal Council was requested to more closely adapt the Swiss corporate law to the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights and to introduce according due-diligence requirements for Swiss 
companies with regard to human rights and the environment (Motion 14.3671). While the motion was rejected by 
the National Council, the Federal Council declared in their official statement their willingness to prepare a respec-
tive consultation draft which takes into account according EU regulation and does not entail any economic or 
commercial disadvantages for Switzerland.19  
In April 2015, a group of 60 NGOs launched the “Responsible Business Initiative” (Konzernverantwortungsinitia-
tive). The popular initiative aims to hold Swiss-based companies accountable for activities abroad by virtue of 
federal regulation. In other words, companies would become obliged to respect internationally agreed CSR 
standards and carrying out due diligence practices. At the time of writing, the collection of the necessary 100’000 
signatures is ongoing. 
The question of whether and to what extent CSR standards effectively protect human rights and the environment 
requires further investigation. In particular, comparative research is needed to assess where Switzerland stands 
in the implementation of such standards when compared to other countries. A recent study on CSR analyses the 
pros and cons of action, finding that the CSR frameworks can vary widely, compliance costs are difficult to esti-
mate and the scope of CSR is widening (Byiers and Bessems 2015). 
5) Automatic exchange of information in tax-related issues 
Recommendation 14 of the 2013 Background Report on Commodities addresses the government’s policy with 
regard to the conclusion of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) and Double Taxation Agreements 
(DTAs) and suggests the conclusion of TIEAs with developing countries if the interest in concluding a DTA does 
not prevail. DTAs aim to prevent double taxation of companies and individuals that are domiciled in more than 
one country and govern administrative assistance in tax matters, Through the exchange of information for tax 
purposes tax evasion by companies, improper transfer pricing and other abusive practices can be detected more 
easily. Yet, whether DTAs contribute to reduce tax avoidance largely depends on how they are framed (Bürgi-
Bonanomi and Meyer-Nandi 2014). Overall, the negotiation of DTAs with developing countries is to be welcomed 
                                                            
18  CSR is defined by the European Commission as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society” 
(European Commission 2011). 
19  See http://www.parlament.ch/d/suche/Seiten/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20143671 (accessed 8 July 2015). 
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as a development policy strategy (Baumgartner 2014).  
In 2013, Switzerland signed the first TIEAs that correspond to the OECD standard with the Isle of Man, Guernsey 
and Jersey. The three agreements entered into force in October 2014. In the meantime, the government has 
signed five more TIEAs with Andorra, Grenada, Greenland, San Marino and Seychelles, Moreover, Switzerland 
has singed DTAs with 51 countries, 41 of which are currently in force.20 Not all of these agreements correspond 
to the according OECD standard. However, the Federal Council considers unilaterally applying the international 
standards to all DTAs, even if their text is not in line with the standard. An according consultation was launched 
from October 2014 to February 2015.21 
Commodity exporting countries are highly exposed to illicit financial flows (LeBillon 2011). Several authors have 
pointed to the need for further research in the area of illicit financial flows and development. In particular, Thut 
(2014) identifies a number of research gaps, and advocates the need for more studies on the effects of DTAs for 
developing countries and on the limits of the current international taxation system. Bürgi-Bonanomi and Meyer-
Nandi (2014) present concrete proposals to improve the disciplines of DTAs concluded by Switzerland with de-
veloping countries. Herkenrath (2014) analyzes the consequences of illicit financial flows for developing coun-
tries, finding that they can have negative impacts. Empirical scientific investigations are however lacking (espe-
cially on political consequences of illicit financial flows). Another important issue that requires further examination 
is the outward dimension of financial flows, particularly with respect to the development impacts of FDIs from 
home to host countries. In the case of Switzerland, it would also be useful to have a comprehensive overview of 
the financial flows directed to and arriving from developing countries. Finally, an analysis of Swiss corporate tax 
policy and potential tax revenues losses for developing countries, along the lines of the study on “Evaluation 
Issues in Financing for Development” commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would be wel-
comed (Weyzig 2013). 
6) Envrionmental responsibilities of the raw material sector 
In October 2012, a popular initiative was launched to promote resource efficiency and sustainable consumption 
(Green Economy Initiative). While proposing the rejection of the initiative, the Federal Council presented a coun-
ter-proposal to the Green Economy initiative which supports the initiative’s goal of sustainable consumption (see 
annex 3), suggesting an amendment of the “Federal Act on the Protection of the Environment” in order to im-
prove product transparency. 
Also, with the Green Economy Action Plan adopted in March 2013, the Federal Council intents, among other 
things, to “increase the environmental responsibility of the raw material sector” (FOEN 2013, Measure 18, 38). 
The Government of Switzerland moreover supports several initiatives to promote sustainable trade of commodi-
ties, including the Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) and the Biotrade Initiative. 
1.3 Knowledge gaps 
Switzerland is a leading financial centre and commodity trading hub. Key stakeholders in 
global commodity production and trade have their head offices in the country. Yet, infor-
mation is still lacking as to how their presence affects the Swiss economy and what the costs 
and benefits are, apart from rough estimates of the sector’s turnover as a percentage of 
Swiss GDP. Further investigation is also needed to better comprehend the relations among 
companies that are mainly involved in, respectively, transit trading and cross-border trading, 
and their spillover effects. Overall, existing data are inconsistent and difficult to compare; 
often, they are missing or yet to be assembled. This is particularly true of historical data, tax-
related information, data on financial flows and value chains related to the commodity sector, 
as well as information on trade practices and tariff escalation. There is also little, if any, aca-
demic research specifically dealing with Swiss companies’ investment activities in commodi-
                                                            
20  See https://www.sif.admin.ch/sif/en/home/themen/internationale-steuerpolitik/doppelbesteuerung-und-amts 
hilfe.html (accessed 8 July 2015). 
21  See http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformationen/00467/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=54902 
(accessed 8 July 2015). 
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ty-dependent developing countries (CDDCs). Specific studies have mostly been carried out 
by NGOs. Most of them are investigations concerning company-specific activities or sector-
specific activities carried out in particular countries such as Nigeria, Angola, and Congo. 
(EvB 2013; 2015).  
Finally, further research is also needed to explore the effectiveness of existing regulations 
affecting the commodity sector and their political, economic and legal impacts, also at a 
comparative level. Comparative analyses should also be conducted in order to assess 
whether higher levels of regulation are associated with increased or lowered levels of com-
petitiveness of commodity hubs. In other words, what are the advantages or disadvantages 
of taking the lead in regulation, i.e. of being first movers? What are the advantages or disad-
vantages of inaction? In Switzerland the issue is still controversial. Yet, research on competi-
tiveness is lacking. We suggest that these issues be addressed by scholarly work, and com-
parative research on level playing field, competiveness of business hubs and their evolution 
be pursued in the future.  
2. Effects of Commodity Trading on Home and Host Countries  
This section takes stock of commodity-related literature from different academic disciplines. 
This literature looks into the effects of commodity trading and, although it does not specifical-
ly relate to Switzerland, it can serve to guide future research on the Swiss commodity sector.  
The section is organized as follows. First, it discusses some preliminary issues inherent in 
the dichotomy between investors’ home and host states which currently informs the literature 
on commodity investment and trading. Inasmuch as the bulk of existing analyses have main-
ly focused on host (resource-rich) countries, subsection 2.2 identifies some relevant research 
questions that future academic research should address in order to shed light on the effects 
of commodity investment and trading on home countries (and Switzerland in particular). This 
is followed by a comprehensive review of the literature on host countries, both with respect to 
the economic effects and the governance-related effects of resource abundance. For both 
areas, the section identifies main knowledge gaps.  
2.1 A difficult distinction between home and host countries  
In commodity research, it is useful to distinguish not only between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ commodi-
ties, but also between investment and trade impacts in an investor’s home country and in its 
host countries. A home country is an investor’s country of origin. A host country is a country 
where a foreign investor runs operations to extract, produce, process, or transport that com-
modity.  
While this concept is fairly simple, many commodity companies engage in vertically integrat-
ed activities along the value chains of specific commodities. This means that they run opera-
tions (investments) at different stages of extraction, processing and distribution of the prod-
uct. A commodity usually passes through a number of stages from extraction to final use, 
and often each stage takes place in a different country. Accordingly, the impact of an invest-
ment in an intermediate processing stage is different from the impact of an investment in the 
country of extraction (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2011). For example, copper may be 
mined and extracted from the ore into refined copper bars in Zambia, in operations owned by 
a Swiss company. The bars may then be exported to China, where another Swiss-owned 
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operation may turn the bars into wire, which is then exported to the US, where it is built into 
electric motors. 
A simple dichotomy between home and host countries fails to account for this complexity. 
Indeed, each stage should be analysed separately as a vertical activity of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). The potential impacts of foreign investments in downstream stages of the 
value chain will differ from their impacts at the extraction stage and in the home country 
(Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2011). To date, this is not adequately reflected in the literature. 
While studies mainly focus on impacts at the extraction stage, impacts on the investor’s 
home state and on countries involved in downstream stages are largely neglected. In view of 
this gap, the following explications nonetheless refer to home and host countries in the ‘tradi-
tional’ sense. 
2.2 Effects on Switzerland as a home country: research issues  
We know little about the effects of commodity-related investments on investors’ home coun-
tries. In the case of Switzerland, there is very little, if any, research on how the presence of 
numerous head offices of large global investors in commodity-based sectors affects the 
country. Such research would be highly relevant and could be organized along the following 
lines. 
Of course, head offices of large global investors in commodity-based sectors create em-
ployment and output and contribute to tax revenues in Switzerland. However, data on the 
extent of these effects are still very scarce (see section 1). Further, a common concern about 
outward FDI is that it substitutes, rather than complements, domestic investment (Barba 
Navaretti, Venables and Barry 2006). This is a demand-side issue: the question is whether or 
not outward FDI increases or reduces the level of aggregate demand in the home economy. 
However, this does not seem to be a concern for commodity trading firms, as they usually 
cannot source their commodities in Switzerland. 
In the case of Switzerland, a more interesting question is how outward FDI affects the supply 
side of the home country. What are the effects on the input structure of production and labour 
skills in Switzerland, on innovation, technological upgrading, and scale economies? And are 
there spillover and external effects on other firms and sectors? In other words, does outward 
investment increase domestic factor productivity, firm capabilities, and other capacities which 
will contribute to longer-term growth performance of the home economy? Much less research 
has been done on these questions in general, and none of the existing studies focuses on 
commodity sectors and activities.  
Since commodity traders as a rule do not engage in production in other industries in Switzer-
land, their potential impacts relate to upstream (supplier) and downstream (customer) linkag-
es and spill-over effects, as well as to external economic effects outside the firm itself but 
possibly within the industry. For example, has the presence of Swiss firms in production and 
trading activities created a pool of technical expertise in Switzerland on these commodities, 
enabling Switzerland (other Swiss firms or official agencies) to take on a role in other sectoral 
activities at the global level, such as standard-setting or product innovation, which could re-
sult in Swiss services exports? Or does the presence of Swiss-based soft-commodity traders 
have any impact, positive or negative, on input sourcing or the cost structure of Swiss farms, 
and thence on Swiss food consumers? There are many similar questions about possible im-
pacts of commodity-related outward FDI on Switzerland. Studying them requires in-depth 
research at both commodity and company levels. 
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2.3 Economic effects of resource abundance in host countries 
There is no in-depth academic research on Swiss companies’ investment activities in com-
modity industries in developing countries; the only studies were done by NGOs (see section 
1.3). As a consequence, this section includes general reflections and refers to literature from 
different academic disciplines that does not specifically relate to Switzerland but can never-
theless guide future research on the Swiss commodity sector. The studies reviewed use a 
wide array of empirical approaches and include ‘large-N’ studies, cross-country analyses, 
and case studies (see also section 3). Economic and political science research on commodi-
ties provides important insights. Many studies have focused on the effects of abundant natu-
ral resources on economic parameters such as growth, development, industrialization, in-
vestments, inflation and currency volatility, public debt, and tax revenues. Other aspects 
such as the impact on labour markets and welfare spending have been less studied. The 
literature in political science has focused on how commodities relate to democracy and de-
mocratization, corruption, and conflict. The extractive industry sector has garnered much 
attention in this respect. In terms of hard commodities, the focus is mostly on economic 
growth, investment flows, democracy, and corruption, while we found a number of studies on 
price fluctuations related in particular to soft agricultural commodities. After some general 
reflections on how FDI can affect host countries, the subsequent sections will expand on 
some of the aspects mentioned.  
 General reflections on impacts of foreign direct investment on host countries  2.3.1
While we know little about the effects of commodity-related investments on investors’ home 
countries, the literature on how the commodity sector affects host countries has increased 
substantially over the years. Besides social and environmental impacts that need to be con-
sidered (see section 3), scholars largely agree on certain impacts of commodity-related FDI 
on the host country’s domestic economy and domestic governance. These impacts differ 
depending on whether they are related to hard commodities or soft commodities.  
Extraction of hard commodities commonly involves ring-fenced activities with few linkages to 
the host economy (UNCTAD 2007). Activities usually involve limited local input sourcing (and 
thus lead to limited local enterprise development). Operations are usually capital-intensive 
and provide relatively few local jobs, especially at higher skill levels, and outputs are export-
ed with little or no local processing (Fung and Korinek 2014). The rights to exploit the natural 
resource are usually owned by the host government, which issues a license or a service con-
tract to a foreign investor in return for a share of the revenue from commodity sales in the 
form of some combination of direct payments, royalties, and taxes (Collier and Venables 
2009; Ruta and Venables 2012).  
From the point of view of development, the critical issues for the host country are its share of 
revenue and its use of that revenue. Whether commodity extraction has a significant long-
term economic impact on the host country often depends on how it spends this revenue – 
whether it is invested in infrastructure, education, and other forms of human capital, or 
whether it is used for consumption or other unproductive spending, such as white elephant 
projects (UNCTAD 2007). In many developing economies, including those depending on 
commodity trading, governance standards related to government revenues and expenditures 
are low, and accountability is limited (see section 2.4). The terms of the arrangements be-
tween investors and the host government are often not made public, which inevitably height-
ens concerns about possible side payments to influential people in the host country. Deci-
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sions on government expenditure are similarly opaque and often not subject to review or au-
dit. These circumstances contribute to political conflict and violence often found in mineral-
rich developing countries (Berman, Couttenier, Rohner, Thoenig 2014). 
The most significant potential positive impact of resource extraction activities on host econ-
omies is thus that they might contribute to enhanced governance. Processes like the Extrac-
tive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and “Publish What You Pay” (an initiative by a 
group of NGOs) are raising awareness of this issue (see section 4.2.2), and home govern-
ments have a potentially important role to play in pressing or requiring outward investors to 
adopt good governance practices in their dealings with developing country governments.22 
The lack of transparency often also extends to tax payments by the foreign investor to the 
host state;23 in this respect, the home government can also assume a helpful role (see sec-
tion 1.2.4). 
Soft (renewable) commodities differ from hard commodities in several respects. To enter the 
market, the foreign investor does not necessarily need a host government licence or contract 
(although access to land may require this in some countries) (UNCTAD 2009). Accordingly, 
the host government cannot obtain a share of the revenue directly or via royalties. The initial 
entry of a foreign investor to grow or source a soft commodity for export can have impacts on 
a significant share of the host country’s population; indeed, it frequently affects more people 
than the extraction of hard commodities, as smallholder farmers who previously used the 
land find their role shifting to that of outgrowers supplying the investor (who often supplies 
credit and production inputs) or waged workers employed by the investor. There is a risk that 
the shift from locally consumed food crops to export crops might have negative implications 
for food security in the host country. On the other hand, there may also be positive implica-
tions in terms of local enterprise development, as there is often more scope than in hard 
commodities for some local processing before export. Home country government actions 
could focus on ensuring that the content of contractual arrangements between investors and 
smallholder outgrowers or employees meet global (home country) standards, that the pro-
cess through which the investor establishes its operation in the host country has involved 
sufficient consultation with groups affected by the entry, and finally that the operations of the 
investment are monitored to ensure that agreements are adhered to. 
 Commodity dependence and economic growth: resource curse and ‘Dutch’ dis-2.3.2
ease 
A whole body of literature has studied the relationship between resource abundance and 
economic growth (Van der Ploeg 2011; Morris, Kaplinsky and Kaplan 2012; Allegret et al. 
2014). A recurring theme underscored by existing studies is that resource-rich countries, par-
ticularly countries richly endowed with hard commodities, tend to experience slower econom-
ic growth rates. The existence of a negative correlation between natural resource abundance 
and economic growth is the core idea at the basis of the ‘resource curse’ theory elaborated 
by Sachs and Warner (2001). The natural resource curse has been studied by means of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods (Frankel 2010, 11). Many scholars corroborated the 
theory with their findings (Manzano and Rigobon 2001; Frankel 2010). In a time series analy-
sis, Auty (2001) observed that resource-poor countries have grown significantly faster than 
                                                            
22  Switzerland has contributed funds to EITI but has not yet joined the process.  
23  In 2011, there was a claim that Glencore was avoiding tax payments in Zambia (EvB 2011). 
19 
 
resource-abundant countries. Collier also confirmed the soundness of the theory, especially 
in developing countries (Collier 2007; Collier 2010).  
Yet, the resource curse remains a contested concept (CEFUP 2013; Cavalcanti et al. 2011; 
Collier and Venables 2009). Some scholars question its magnitude or even its existence 
(Davis 2009; Frankel 2010), and point to successful examples of commodity-rich countries 
with positive growth rates, such as Norway and Botswana (Van der Ploeg 2011). Many 
scholars argue that the parabola of resource-led development depends on institutional fac-
tors, such as the existence of well-functioning institutions (Collier and Goderis 2008; Wein-
thal and Luong 2006). While commodities may provide development opportunities (Van der 
Ploeg 2011), positive long-term development depends on a functioning institutional frame-
work and a mix of policy interventions (Frankel 2010; Van der Ploeg 2011; Collier and Gode-
ris 2008). According to Frankel (2010, 1), the risk related to natural resources can be mitigat-
ed by interventions such as “indexation of oil contracts, hedging of export proceeds, denomi-
nation of debt in terms of oil, Chile-style fiscal rules, a monetary target that emphasizes 
product prices, transparent commodity funds, and lump-sum distribution”. (Frankel 2010, 1) 
More generally, resource-rich countries seem to be more exposed to commodity depend-
ence, institutional failures, corruption, tax avoidance, and the ‘Dutch disease’.24 The latter 
term describes the phenomenon by which reliance on earnings from exports of hard com-
modities may affect the overall economic structure of resource-rich countries via appreciation 
of real exchange rates (Frankel 2010; Barder 2006; Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984). 
The process can be described as follows: after the discovery of a specific (hard) commodity, 
exports of the said commodity increase and the natural resource sector develops. As a con-
sequence, and particularly in periods of high commodity prices, the country’s currency ap-
preciates, leading to a decline in investment and output from the manufacturing and agricul-
tural sectors, as these sectors lose competitiveness in the global market and also relative to 
imports in the domestic market. Accordingly, commodity abundance often comes with posi-
tive short-term effects and negative long-term effects on real-term economic growth (Collier 
and Goderis 2008; Weinthal and Luong 2006). This theory is widely supported (Ruta and 
Venables 2012). 
The resource curse is often mentioned in relation to existing business relationships between 
commodity firms and government agencies and/or state-owned companies that are charac-
terized by corruption, bribery, and money laundering (see section 4.2.2). Tax avoidance has 
also been mentioned as closely connected to the resource curse (see section 2.4.3), alt-
hough commodity-specific literature in this regard is fairly scarce. Fostering corruption and 
undermining economic development, the resource curse ostensibly creates conditions under 
which human rights violations typically occur (see section 3).  
Regarding the drivers of the resource curse, there is a certain consensus that it has to do 
with the ‘rents’ that are usually available to those who control the resource, because the price 
of the resource (on the world market) is not connected in any way with the cost of extraction. 
This leads to conflict amongst parties over ‘property rights’ relating to the resource or the 
land where it is located. There is less consensus on whether the curse is ‘inevitable’, i.e. re-
source-rich countries necessarily experience low growth, conflict and poor governance, and 
on how to address or avoid the curse. There is a particular need for research that investi-
gates measures to combat corruption in both home and host countries and puts them in rela-
                                                            
24  The expression was introduced in the late 1970s to describe the shrinkage of the manufacturing sector experi-
enced by the Netherlands throughout the decade as a consequence of the excessive exploitation of natural 
gas earnings (Barder 2006; Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984; Davies 1995).  
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tion to domestic and international measures aimed at strengthening institutions, at the same 
time providing an effective remedy against ‘Dutch-disease’ dynamics. In this respect, it is 
worth noting that ‘Dutch-disease’ is, above all, a macroeconomic issue resulting from large 
surpluses in the balance of payments. As such, it may not necessarily be related to govern-
ance issues such as corruption as it can occur in any country (i.e. including resource-poor 
economies) which experience large capital inflows, e.g. from foreign aid.  
 Commodity dependence and the post-extractivism debate in Latin America 2.3.3
The Prebisch–Singer hypothesis posits that commodity prices decline over the long run 
compared to those of manufactured goods (UNCTAD 2012b, 2). The hypothesis is debata-
ble, and evidence is mixed – it depends strongly on the countries and commodities included 
in the analysis, and on the period analysed. Still, the decline of commodity prices relative to 
that of manufactured goods is considered an obstacle constraining developing countries’ 
efforts to develop – a problem which is also referred to as ‘commodity dependence’ (ibid; 
Harvey, Kellard et al. 2010; Arezki, Hadri et al. 2013). 
The classical debates about commodity dependence and resource curse phenomena tend to 
focus primarily on host country failures, whereas systemic failures and the responsibilities of 
home countries and international governance do not receive adequate attention. The debate 
about post-extractivism which is currently ongoing in a range of Latin American countries is 
an attempt to reverse the premises of the discussion and find ways to avoid post-colonial 
patterns of commodity dependence. It is directed towards host countries taking direct control 
of their own commodity sector and at least a significant part of the related value chains. 
Since it reflects significant ongoing developments in Latin America, we present the main ide-
as of the debate in what follows.  
The debate on post-extractivism is a 21st-century update of a long debate on persisting fea-
tures of colonial and postcolonial history and is most prominent in Latin America. It acknowl-
edges that the global economy has differentiated into a complex and constantly changing 
network of regions that are characterized, first, by their position in the value chain: a region 
either belongs to one of the centres of industrial production in which value is added to the 
material value of natural resources by means of labour; or it belongs to one of the peripheries 
rich in resources or labour. If a region abounds in natural resources, its economic develop-
ment tends to emphasize extractive and export-oriented production of prime materials such 
as minerals, oil, gas, timber, fibres, food, fish, and others (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014, 21-46).  
Second, post-extravist theories refer to the dependency theory, according to which the rela-
tion between centres and peripheries is based on power asymmetries.25 These power 
asymmetries can only be overcome by means of political and economic emancipation, which 
requires combining resource extraction with industrialization, by strengthening the role of the 
state and state regulation. Such emancipation is also described as the path from extractive to 
post-extractive economies (Kay 2010). Proponents of the post-extractivism debate take a 
                                                            
25  The dependency theory implies that poor countries (whether resource rich or not) cannot develop as surpluses 
always flow out to the centre, making growth inevitably low. The theory is contentious, due to different empiri-
cal findings (see, e.g., the strong growth of many developing economies in the past 30–40 years, starting with 
Korea & Taiwan in the 1970s and, more recently, China, Vietnam, Brazil, India, etc.). Prebisch-Singer led to 
policies of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) in the 1950s, especially in Latin America, which worked well 
until the 1970s; then growth declined, and ISI policies were replaced by more market-led export oriented poli-
cies. These had some success in generating growth in some countries especially after 2000, as Chinese de-
mand for resources grew. Yet, the outbreak of the financial crisis and slower Chinese growth seem to have put 
an end to this phase, too. Post-extractivist theories make an attempt to present new market options inspired by 
the ISI area. 
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critical stance towards the idea of the ‘resource curse’. Instead of focusing on extractive 
economies’ governance outcomes, the post-extractivism discourse concentrates on the polit-
ical root cause of dependencies that lead to these governance outcomes. 
While the need for advancing towards post-extractivism is widely acknowledged, the ques-
tion of how to achieve this goal is highly controversial. A first strand of policies – often under-
pinning the new leftist governments of Latin America – emphasize the need to overcome the 
neoliberal theories that dominated the last four decades. Consequently, as a first step, they 
aim to bring back the state as a key economic and political actor. This key step includes 
stronger regulation of the extractive industry (and other industries) to increase the state’s 
financial and political capacities to reduce poverty, counteract socio-political exclusion, and 
improve social and productive infrastructures and services by means of public investments. 
While this progressive ‘neo-extractivism’ has been particularly successful in reducing poverty 
– by 32% in Bolivia, 26% in Peru, 23% in Venezuela, and 22% in Ecuador from 2000 to 2012 
(UNDP 2014) – its negative effects in the form of environmental and, in some cases, cultural 
externalities have been strongly contested (Gudynas 2012). Critics argue that neo-
extractivism neither takes account of the internal contradictions emerging from modern forms 
of financialized capital accumulation – as either a potential or a concrete risk – nor considers 
the need for economic policymaking to respect the ecological and social limits of economic 
growth. Accordingly, they stress the need to harness new, radically reframed notions of de-
velopment, for example in the terms of vivir bien/living well (Thomson 2011) and the underly-
ing relations between society and nature. They suggest that this be done, for example, by 
constitutionalizing the rights of ‘Nature’ (Acosta & Martínez 2009) or ‘Mother Earth’ (Boff 
2012) as part of rethinking development in terms of ‘post-developmentalism’. Acknowledging 
fundamental criticisms of the concept of development itself, as brought forward by the French 
‘regulation school’ (Gajst 2010), de-growth and dematerialization (Calisto Friant & Langmore 
2014; Martínez-Alier 2012) and feminism (Carrasco 2006) offers approaches that could guide 
the development of new policy models. Gudynas (2012) argues that the currently dominant 
model of progressive neo-extractivism should be overcome by shifting towards ‘precaution-
ary extractivism’ in a first step. This would mean increasing regulation and democratic control 
over financial gains and ensuring strict compliance with national and international environ-
mental, health, and taxation standards. An increasing share of the extractive rent would need 
to be invested into national or regional projects of industrialization. In a second step, shifting 
from ‘precautionary’ to ‘required’ extractivism would mean shifting exportation away from 
global to national and continental markets and making efforts to substitute the use of fossil 
fuels and non-renewable minerals as a fundamental feature of economic policies. In this way, 
the economy would gradually move towards extracting only what is absolutely required, or 
towards ‘minimalized extractivism’. 
However, this vision is criticized for the fact that the political, institutional, and regulatory 
frameworks required for achieving such a transition are far from available (Foster 2011); 
moreover, it uses an overgeneralized notion of extractivism that glosses over the fact that 
there are different forms of economic capitalist systems (Jessop 2013), including in Latin 
America. As long as it does not take into account the complex diversity of market formations 
that characterize the different countries in Latin America, the general rejection of extractivism 
remains too idealistic and falls short of outlining concrete trajectories of change. Although it is 
possible and necessary to search for local solutions to escape extractivism, it needs to be 
considered that, according to the theory, “a global crisis cannot be solved at local level, even 
in a slower, less runaway world that is partly decoupled from the world market and that em-
phasizes local sustainability. There can be no quick fix to the crisis and more imaginative 
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work remains to be done to promote a no-growth, solidarity economy that allows for econom-
ic and social justice in the ‘Global South’”. (Jessop 2012, 23) 
 Price volatility, supply and demand, and speculation 2.3.4
The issue of price volatility in the commodity sector has been widely debated in academic 
literature. Commodity prices experience substantial fluctuations from time to time. The first 
decade of the new millennium was marked by a long period of high price volatility, especially 
affecting trade in fuels, minerals, and agricultural commodities (Ruta and Venables 2012, 8). 
Since World War II, international markets have been affected by two major commodity 
‘booms’: the first one occurred in the 1970s and the second one between 2003 and 2008 
(UNCTAD 2012b, 30). Commodity prices increased rapidly from 1971 to 1974. After 1974, 
they declined slowly until 1991, with two small intermediate peaks in 1978 and 1984 (Bo-
renzstein and Reinhart 1994, 241). After 1991, commodity prices remained stable. A slight 
increase took place between 1994 and 1996 (Gilbert and Morgan 2010, 3024). After 2003, 
commodity prices boomed once again, and declined after the outbreak of the economic and 
financial crisis in 2008 (Gilbert 2010, 399). The increase in commodity prices between 2002 
and 2008 was general: oil prices increased (Cheung and Moring 2007), prices of metals 
boomed (Humphreys 2010), and those of agricultural commodities also grew (Robles, Torero 
and Braun 2009). Increased price volatility in recent years is documented by recent statistical 
analyses and long-term comparisons (Harvey, Kellard et al. 2010; Arezki, Hadri et al. 2013). 
Many consequences of commodity price fluctuations have been investigated to date. Com-
modity prices are highly relevant because they are closely linked with business cycles and 
strong drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations (Gubler and Hertweck 2013). Commodity pric-
es can also explain inflation (ibid.); they are particularly strongly related to domestic inflation 
cycles in commodity-exporting countries (Bloch, Dockery and Sapsford 2006). The relation-
ship between exchange rate uncertainty and commodity trade has also been studied: schol-
ars investigated bilateral trade regimes (for instance between the United States and Mexico, 
China, or Spain) and found that exchange rate volatility reduces commodity trade (Bahami-
Oskooee and Wang 2007; Bahami-Oskooee and Hegerty 2009; Bahami-Oskooee, Harvey 
and Hegerty 2014). Others observed a relationship between the real exchange rate of com-
modity-exporting countries’ currency and the real prices of their commodity exports. This so-
called currency–commodity relationship describes the parallel movement of real currency 
exchange rates and real commodity prices. The relationship is, however, not constant and 
may vary considerably over time (Cashin, Céspedes and Sahay 2004). The debate about the 
consequences of commodity price fluctuations is still ongoing and further research is needed. 
A holistic approach explaining the interconnections between the different impacts related to 
price volatility in the commodity sector would be particularly useful. 
The drivers of commodity price fluctuations have also been investigated thoroughly. Accord-
ing to the ‘traditional structural approach’, commodity prices are determined mainly by de-
mand; this view has, however, limited explanatory power in accounting for the price cycles in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Borenzstein and Reinhart 1994). According to Borenzstein and Rein-
hart, this is because it focuses only on industrialized countries’ demand; by contrast, com-
modity supply and a broader ‘world’ demand can jointly explain fluctuations in commodity 
prices (ibid.). The explanatory power of a broader global demand is confirmed by various 
other studies, which demonstrate that emerging countries’ demand for commodities has a 
strong influence on commodity prices (Cheung and Moring 2007; Baffes and Hanoitis 2010). 
Other commodity-specific factors of supply and demand, such as new discover-
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ies, exploitation technologies and their costs, the level of economic activity in large econo-
mies (short-term demand effects), as well as innovation (long-term demand effects) are 
equally important. The use of trade restrictive measures affecting trade in commodities may 
also have an effect on commodity prices trends (Espa 2015). However, further analysis is 
needed, particularly concerning the growing demand for critical raw materials.  
Finally, commodity speculation – roughly understood as the buying and selling of commodity 
futures with the only intention to make profits (Radetzski 2008) – has become a major issue 
of concern with respect to commodity price volatility. One of the main fears is that speculative 
activities will lead to commodity price fluctuations. The academic literature thus far has al-
most exclusively dealt with this aspect with respect to soft commodities.26 A recent meta-
analysis commissioned by the NGO Foodwatch has pinpointed the magnitude and drivers of 
speculation in the context of soft commodities (Bass 2013). The review suggests that index 
funds play an important role in the increase of soft commodity prices. Moreover, speculative 
activities on the part of financial intermediaries are also identified as a possible cause of 
price volatility (Davidson 2008; Robles, Torero and Braun 2009; Cifarelli and Paladino 2010). 
Evidence is, however, not conclusive. Many studies dispute that commodity speculation in-
creases the prices of (soft) commodities and worsens price volatility (Glauben et al. 2012; 
IOSCO 2009; Conrad 2014; Pies et al. 2013). A central concern for future research should 
be, first, to ascertain the magnitude of speculation in the commodity sector and, second, to 
establish consensus on the extent to which speculative activities are responsible for price 
rises and price fluctuations.  
 
Box 3: Specific Research on Price Volatility 
Energy commodities (oil, gas, coal) 
A substantial share of research on energy commodities has focused on oil (Looney 2012). Triggered by the 
1970s oil shocks (Kline and Weyant 1982), a number of studies in the 1970s and 1980s focused on the conse-
quences of oil price shocks on economic growth (Hamilton 1983). Since the beginning of the 21st century, the 
attention has shifted towards the impact of demand shocks on real oil prices, particularly with respect to the 
growth of developing Asia (Cheung and Moring 2007; Zhang et al. 2014). In this context, the evolution of the role 
of OPEC and its loss of influence as a cartel regrouping major oil producing countries has also been scrutinized 
(Kaufmann et al. 2004). Some studies suggest that market price escalation of crude oil was caused by specula-
tion related to futures contracts (Davidson 2008). Other studies do not find significant correlation between specu-
lation on oil and increases in oil prices (Haase, Seiler and Zimmerman 2013). According to recent studies, more-
over, new actors are increasing in importance in oil extraction, such as national oil companies (NOCs) (Baker 
Institute 2007). Finally, the effects of new developments in oil and gas extraction, such as shale gas and tight oil, 
have gained prominence in recent analysis of oil prices (Troner 2014). 
Minerals / base metals 
Since 1945, three commodity booms affected minerals and metals: the first occurred in the early 1950s, the 
second from the early to mid-1970s, and the third from 2003 to 2008 (Radetzi et al. 2008). The 2003–2008 metal 
boom is not categorized as a supercycle but, rather, as a large cyclical boom (Radetzi et al. 2008). Academic 
literature supports the thesis of a demand-led metal price explosion (Humphreys 2010) driven by emerging 
economies, especially China and India (Chen 2010). 
Precious metals (gold, silver, platinum) 
Precious metals are important in finance because of their high values. Gold is a rare metal, and it is financially 
                                                            
26  There are, however, a plethora of studies by NGOs on hard commodities (see e.g. Mugglin 2014 and refer-
ences therein cited).  
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traded in different ways – gold bullion, gold stocks, gold mutual funds, and gold exchange-traded funds – which 
also have different properties as forms of investment (diversifying, hedging, and safe-haven properties) (Pullen et 
al. 2014). Precious metals differ from each other, although they have structural commonalities; for example, the 
price volatilities of gold, silver, platinum and palladium are determined by different factors and therefore these 
metals cannot be represented in a single asset class or by a single index (Batten et al. 2010). At this point in our 
research, we found little literature which focuses on precious metals. Further research in this area is needed, for 
example on gold speculation or on how the gold price relates to the prices of other commodities. 
Agricultural commodities (cocoa, coffee, sugar, soya, cereals) 
Price volatility in agricultural commodities is a widely discussed topic in academic research, although it is not a 
new phenomenon (Gilbert and Morgan 2010). Several studies have analysed the fluctuations of agricultural 
commodity prices over the last decades: they started increasing in 2002-2003, peaked in 2008, and declined 
from 2008 to 2011 (Robles, Torero and Braun 2009; Pies et al. 2013; Brümmer et al. 2013). Different studies 
offer different explanations for these fluctuations. According to Robles, Torero and Braun (2009), speculative 
activities in futures markets contributed to the price spikes in 2008. By contrast, Pies et al. (2013) find that specu-
lation did not have a big impact on price volatility during the food price crises of the late 2000s. According to 
Conrad, speculation influences prices of agricultural commodities only if it creates a significant excess demand 
over a significant time period (Conrad 2014). Future research should concentrate on the impacts of speculative 
activities on fluctuations of agricultural commodity prices. 
Biofuels 
The impact of biofuel production on growing food prices is contentious. While some argue that there is no such 
correlation (Baffes and Haniotis 2010; Gilbert 2010), others claim that the influence is substantial (Gallagher 
2008). In terms of figures, the demand for biofuels is increasing: in 2003-2004, 5% of the global maize harvest 
was used for biofuel production; by 2011, the share of biofuel in world maize consumption had increased to 15% 
(UNCTAD 2012b, 47). This increased consumption of maize for biofuel production is, among others, supported 
by high government subsidies. The discussion about the potential impact of biofuel production on growing food 
prices is ongoing: the EU and the USA have introduced policies to avoid substitution of food production by biofu-
el production (ibid., 50).  
 Knowledge gaps 2.3.5
Resource abundance may affect the development trajectories of commodity dependent 
countries and the structure of their economies. Yet, the soundness of the resource curse 
theory is still subject to debate and the consequences of commodity-related investments on 
host countries are still not clear. The effects of speculative activities in the sector need deep-
er analysis and a differentiated perspective for single commodities. 
2.4 Governance-related effects of resource abundance in host 
countries 
Besides its economic relevance, resource-abundance has been studied at length with re-
spect to its effects on the political and institutional fabric of commodity dependent countries. 
The following sections give an overview of the literature exploring the relationship between 
commodity abundance and governance-related issues. 
 Democracy vs autocratic regimes 2.4.1
The concept of resource curse has been used in a modified form to address links between 
commodity abundance and the existence of autocratic regimes. The phenomenon is also 
referred to as ‘political resource curse’ (Liou and Musgrave 2014; Wiens 2014; Ross 2015). 
Some studies have shown that countries which are rich in natural resources, especially in 
hard commodities such as oil and minerals, are more likely to be ruled by autocratic regimes 
(Ross 2012). Accordingly, a number of analyses have found a negative correlation between 
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natural resource abundance and democracy (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Ahmadov 
2014). The concept is, however, far from being unanimously recognized. Haber and Menaldo 
(2011), for example, conducted a ‘large-N’ study and found no statistically significant rela-
tionship between resource reliance and authoritarianism. Mitchell analysed the importance of 
oil and carbon in the industrialization of several democratic countries, arguing that fossil en-
ergy actually enabled the development of modern democracies (Mitchell 2009; Mitchell 
2011). Some studies found that whether resource abundance affects national forms of gov-
ernment very much depends on the channels through which commodity rents are used and 
on how public expenditure patterns develop (Dunning 2008; Arezki and Brückner 2012). 
Others have analysed the correlation between FDI and political regimes, arguing that democ-
racy may have a negative effect on FDI attraction in the case of hard commodities (Asiedu 
and Lien 2011). This topic is closely related to the issue of corruption (see section 2.4.2), and 
requires further investigation. Ross (2015) argues that, although academic studies on the 
political resource curse have proliferated since 2001, many issues remain unresolved, name-
ly “the scope of the resource effect, the conditions under which it occurs, the mechanisms 
that explain it, and how it can best be remedied”. 
 Corruption, bribery, and money laundering 2.4.2
Resource-rich countries are more exposed to corruption (Global Financial Integrity and Afri-
can Development Bank 2013), especially when resource rights and income distribution are 
not systematically regulated. According to Transparency International, corruption involves 
“the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Corruption tends to be more likely in re-
source-rich countries with weak democratic institutions (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010). As 
Petermann et al. (2007) demonstrate, however, the effects of fuel and non-fuel commodities 
on corruption can be quite different. The risk of corruption has been studied mainly in the 
context of the oil industry to date. While some scholars identify a positive correlation between 
oil abundance/dependence and corruption (see e.g. Arezki and Brückner 2011), others main-
tain that the relationship between these two is heterogeneous (see e.g. Melo and Quinn 
2015). In a quantitative study, Busse and Gröning (2013) show that the existence of natural 
resources may increase corruption. The greater the amount of commodities exported, the 
greater the propensity for corruption.27 Kolstad and Wiig (2013) even suggest that extractive 
companies systematically use corruption to gain access to commodities. This means that 
high levels of corruption do not necessarily prevent multinationals from investing in a re-
source-rich country in the global South, and might actually be a reason for them to do so. In 
addition, empirical evidence shows that corruption is detrimental to development (Olatunde 
2011). It also potentially leads to low human rights performances, as countries with poor 
economic growth often witness abuses of basic human rights (see section 3). Overall, the 
inconsistencies in current research on corruption imply that more research is needed to dis-
entangle the factors causing or preventing corruption and to gain knowledge about the links 
between corruption and FDI, in particular with respect to Swiss-based investors (see e.g. 
Rybi and Longchamp 2014).  
                                                            
27  Other governance indicators – the quality of bureaucracy and impartiality of the legal system – do not seem to 
be affected by the abundance of natural resources. Busse and Gröning (2013, 6) measure the level of corrup-
tion within a political system, including financial corruption (e.g. demands for special payments and bribes in 
connection with import and export licenses, exchange controls, or tax assessments), excessive patronage, 
nepotism, or secret party funding. Bureaucracy quality measures the strength of the bureaucracy. Strong bu-
reaucracy means that the bureaucratic system acts as a shock absorber, minimizing policy revisions when 
there is a change in government. The law variable quantifies the strength and impartiality of the legal system. 
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Bribery describes the act of taking or receiving something which is given with the intention of 
influencing the recipient in some way favourable to the party providing the bribe. Evidence 
shows that corruption and bribery are particularly common in the oil, gas, coal, and minerals 
and metals sectors (Eigen 2007; Karl 1997; Transparency International 2014). Bribery has 
been observed in both extractive and trading companies in these sectors (Le Billion 2011). 
Precise estimates of the magnitude of bribery in the commodity sector in general and the 
Swiss commodity sector more specifically are missing. 
Money laundering denotes the process by which the proceeds of crime are transformed into 
legitimate money or other assets (Chatain et al. 2009). Research has pointed out that corrup-
tion and money laundering in developing countries are positively correlated (Aluko and 
Bagheri 2012). The key concern with respect to the commodity sector is that powerful com-
panies enter business relations with governments of countries with weak legal frameworks. 
The risk of money laundering is particularly pronounced in the extractive industries, as evi-
denced by a report on the Canadian diamond industry (Schneider 2004). In line with the 
Background Report of the Interdepartmental Platform on Commodities of the Federal Council 
(Swiss Federal Council 2013), money laundering appears more likely under certain owner-
ship conditions, such as when commodity companies are owned by politically exposed per-
sons or by governments that exhibit deficiencies in the areas of political or human rights. 
Scientific estimates of the magnitude of money laundering in the commodity sector are hard 
to find. However, given that money laundering and corruption are positively correlated (Aluko 
and Bagheri 2012) and that corruption has proved a recurring practice in the commodity sec-
tor, there is a fair chance that money laundering too might be part of how the commodity sec-
tor works. Moreover, money laundering engenders political instability and economic retro-
gression of developing countries (ibid.). Accordingly, it is very likely that commodity firms 
engaging in money laundering are complicit in creating conditions under which human rights 
violations prosper (see section 4.2.2). Research is needed to underpin these hypotheses 
with a more solid empirical basis. 
 Tax avoidance 2.4.3
Tax avoidance is the practice by which multinational corporations exploit the differences be-
tween national tax regimes. While tax avoidance is highly controversial, it is not specific to 
the commodity sector as it determines how multinationals in general operate. Corporations 
engaging in tax avoidance – which is at times also referred to as ‘base erosion and profit 
shifting’ (OECD 2013a) – make use of existing tax laws to reduce their respective tax burden. 
Tax avoidance, unlike tax evasion or fraud, is not per se illegal; its legality very much de-
pends on the domestic laws and the international agreements (particularly double taxation 
agreements) in place (with respect to Switzerland, see Bürgi Bonanomi and Meyer-Nandi 
2014). 
While the academic literature is replete with empirical and theoretical studies on tax avoid-
ance, research focusing on the peculiarities of the commodity sector is scarce. Despite the 
lack of scientific evidence regarding the total amount of tax avoidance in the commodity sec-
tor, the OECD (2013a) takes issue with the tendency of many internationally operating corpo-
rations to disconnect the location of actual business activities from the location where the 
profits from these activities are taxed. The broader implications of tax avoidance, including its 
relation with the resource curse, are widely debated within the NGO community, notably the 
Berne Declaration (EvB 2011) but less so in academic research. The contention that tax 
avoidance is a key driver of the resource curse has garnered support from political leaders 
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such as the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. These assertions will have to be ad-
dressed and verified empirically by future research, as well as Switzerland’s role in support-
ing or preventing tax avoidance and the resource curse at large.  
  Transfer mispricing and trade mispricing 2.4.4
Transfer mispricing (also known as transfer pricing manipulation or abusive transfer pricing) 
is a topical issue in commodity trading. Transfer mispricing occurs whenever two companies 
that are part of the same multinational group trade with each other (trade pricing), but artifi-
cially distort the price at which the trade is recorded in order to minimize taxes in the coun-
tries in which they do business. In contrast to transfer pricing, which is per se a legal activity, 
transfer mispricing is an abusive and illegal practice whose incidence has increased in paral-
lel to the growing role of multinational corporations, which make taxation more complex. 
Transfer pricing manipulation is an activity used by multinational corporations to reduce the 
taxation of their profits through over- or under-invoicing of intra-firm transactions (Eden 2012, 
205). The manipulation of transfer prices entails an income shifting among countries (ibid.) 
and developing countries can therefore suffer tax revenue losses (Le Billon 2014, 51). Even 
though a conclusive overview of the amount of transfer mispricing in the Swiss commodity 
sector is out of the question, our experience suggests that – as a general rule – Swiss-based 
commodity firms engage in transfer pricing rather than in mispricing. 
At an aggregate level, transfer mispricing develops into trade mispricing, i.e. the activity of 
manipulating international trade prices. The manipulation occurs through “the deliberate 
over-invoicing of imports or under-invoicing of exports” (Hollingshead 2010, 2). Trade mis-
pricing is considered “the most important source of illicit flows of capital out of developing 
countries” (Cobham et al. 2014, 8) because it is a channel for money laundering and corrup-
tion. The implications of trade mispricing for developing countries can be enormous: accord-
ing to some estimates, the total tax revenue losses amount to 98 to 106 billion dollars annu-
ally, that is, about 4.4 percent of the total revenues of developing countries (Hollingshead 
2010, 2). Trade mispricing is an issue of concern for Switzerland, as it seems to be widely 
applied to commodity exports to and from Switzerland (Cobham et al. 2014).  
The concept of trade mispricing has however been highly disputed for two main reasons: 
first, differences and inconsistencies in trade statistics would make it difficult to estimate the 
exact magnitude of mispricing, especially in terms of country-level comparisons; second, 
current statistics would be misleading in that they do not make the necessary distinctions 
between the use of the terms ‘trade mispricing’, ‘trade asymmetries’ and ‘illicit financial flows’ 
(Nitsch 2012). Nitsch (2012) calls therefore for caution in drawing conclusions from statistics. 
Additional academic research could address the existing knowledge gaps on transfer mis-
pricing, particularly in the direction of “greater accessibility to transaction-level data on cross-
border export and import transactions and on MNE income statements and balance sheets”. 
(Eden 2012, 205) 
 Conflicts and civil wars 2.4.5
Resource dependence has been found to be conducive to violence and armed conflict. Con-
flicts may arise out of the aspiration to gain control over resources and can be sustained by 
using resources as a large earning source. (Le Billon 2001). However, the link between re-
source dependence and conflict is not generally accepted. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), 
for example, argue that, although civil war creates dependence on primary sector exports, 
the reverse is not true. In their view, resource abundance is associated with a reduced prob-
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ability of the onset of war. In contrast, a study on illegal gold mining in Colombia shows that 
an increase in the exploitation of metals like gold – particularly illegal exploitation – has ex-
acerbated violence in richly-endowed municipalities (Idrobo, Mejía and Tribin 2014). 
Companies operating in hostile environments are frequently faced with the dilemma of pro-
tecting their premises and personnel while avoiding complicity in human rights abuses com-
mitted by the private and public security forces they hire for this task (Banfield 2003; Lilly 
2000). Local governments may force companies by law to rely on their public security forces 
(Banfield 2003; Nelson 2000; Watts 2005), which are notorious for committing human rights 
violations in response to protests, particularly against oil companies (Kaeb 2008). The pro-
tection of extractive industry infrastructure is a key business for private military and security 
firms as well (Mathieu et al. 2007). 
Other studies have focused on how commodity abundance might lead to political instability. 
Le Billon (2001) observed a shift in how wars evolve and how conflicts are financed: during 
the Cold War, conflicts were financed mainly by the two competing superpowers and their 
allies; in the 1990s, these external financial transfers were replaced by revenues from natural 
resource exploitation as the main instrument for financing conflicts. Statistical studies largely 
confirm Le Billon’s observations and establish a correlation or causation between commodity 
abundance and conflicts (Morelli and Rohner 2014; Berman et al. 2014; Caselli, Morelli and 
Rohner 2014). Berman et al. (2014) found that the existence of mineral resources and mines 
increases the financing capacities of combatant groups and contributes to the spreading of 
violence. Caselli, Morelli and Rohner (2014) tested the argument that resource abundance is 
a predictor of interstate conflicts and found that the presence of oil was an important predic-
tor for interstate war in the second half of the 20th century.  
Overall, the likelihood of armed conflict appears to depend on the type of commodity. Some 
evidence suggests that agricultural commodities reduce the probability of an outbreak of con-
flict, whereas mineral resources, as well as the value and quantity of a country’s natural re-
sources, increase this probability (Welsch 2008). Although several studies confirm the corre-
lation between resource abundance and conflict, most of them use indicators at the national 
or international levels. A better understanding of causes and effects requires more evidence 
at the subnational level and more knowledge about low-intensity conflicts (Koubi et al. 2014). 
 Local human rights impacts in general 2.4.6
While the phenomena described in the preceding sections may often result in national-level 
human rights violations (see section 4.2), the commodity sector is also frequently associated 
with human rights violations at the local level. The following two subsections give an over-
view of literature offering general statements in this regard. Commodity-specific local impacts 
of the commodity sector are discussed in section 3 below. Whether these specific impacts 
constitute human rights violations needs to be examined on a case-by-case basis. 
In the course of his mandate, John Ruggie, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Issues of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, and Other Business Enter-
prises, studied adverse human rights impacts by industries. His conclusion was that the ex-
tractive industry accounts for 28% of all allegations, which is the largest share reached by 
any single industry (Ruggie 2013, 25-26). The extractive industry, according to the Special 
Representative, “has a large local footprint in terms of the scale of its impact, often in areas 
inhabited by minority populations” (Ruggie 2013, 26). The most common transgressions in-
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clude inadequate procedures for resettlement of populations, insufficient security of the per-
son, and adverse impacts on livelihoods (Ruggie 2013, 26).  
a) Workplace-related human rights violations 
Among the most frequently discussed labour-related human rights issues in the commodity 
sector are child labour and forced labour. Both of them are considered to be particularly sali-
ent in certain branches of mining (e.g. artisanal mining) and in the agricultural sector. Child 
labour in particular is discussed most frequently in relation to small-scale and artisanal min-
ing (IPEC 2006a), where children as young as 4–5 years old are helping in mining activities 
(IPEC 2006b). Child labour in small-scale mines is generally considered “the worst form of 
child labour” because of the dangers and hazards connected to it (Hilson 2010). Much of the 
literature focuses on the sub-Sahara African context, and some authors point out that the 
complexity of the issue is not well understood to date (see e.g. Hilson 2010; 2012). While 
artisanal mining can provide locals with a livelihood alternative to activities such as fishing or 
farming, working conditions in the mines are precarious, unsafe, and dangerous, especially 
for children (see e.g. Huesca 2013). Mercury poisoning in small-scale gold mining has been 
identified as a particular danger for children (see IPEC 2006; Bose-O’Reilly et al. 2008). Yet, 
women are also disproportionately affected. They hold little power, are ill-informed, and earn 
less than men – and hence they remain in vulnerable at-risk positions. Overcoming gender 
inequities is regarded as one of the main preconditions to achieving greater sustainability in 
small-scale gold mining (Hinton, Veiga and Beinhoff 2003). 
Forced labour is a related problem in the mining sector and sometimes occurs in combination 
with child labour. Mining companies who invest in mining projects in countries with weak 
governance and unstable institutions and who fail to conduct proper due diligence risk be-
coming complicit in forced labour schemes (Human Rights Watch 2013). 
While some evidence exists, more is needed. A gap exists in particular with regard to com-
prehensive impact studies which at the same time attempt to detract common features (see 
section 3). 
b) Community-related human rights violations 
The extractive sector has a particularly large impact on local communities (Ruggie 2013, 24). 
Two main types of community-related human rights violations are commonly discussed in the 
literature: first, violations linked to the consent and participation of local and indigenous 
communities, sometimes combined with instances of their forced and ill-compensated dis-
placement; second, violations linked to corporate activities in conflict and post-conflict zones 
that often rely on abusive security forces (see section 4.2.4). 
A persistent and recurring problem in the extractive industries is improper consultation and 
involvement of communities and their (forced) displacement without proper compensation. 
The acquisition of concessions by large extractive companies and of large tracts of land by 
global investors (so-called ‘land grabbing’) affects small-scale miners in the minerals and 
metals sector (Geenen 2014). While mining operations can benefit local communities, this 
does not happen automatically, but depends on the involvement and consultation of local 
communities as partners (Veiga, Scoble, and MacAllister 2001). However, some scholars 
argue that local people’s capacity to bargain or give free consent to investments is limited at 
the outset by their lack of access to economic and institutional alternatives (Vermeulen and 
Cotula 2010). As a result, community engagement can lead to problematic dependencies of 
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communities on mining companies (Auty 1998; Frynas 2005). For this reason, capacity build-
ing in local communities – aimed not least at the diversification of their economy – has been 
identified as another crucial element in the development of sustainable mining communities 
(Veiga, Scoble, and MacAllister 2001). Furthermore, both mining companies and govern-
ments should adopt gender-sensitive approaches to developing extractive industries. This is 
needed to address the problem that men in extractive communities commonly capture the 
greater share of extraction project benefits, whereas women and children experience the 
greater share of associated risks (Ward, Strongman et al. 2012). Similar patterns have been 
observed in the soft commodity sector when investors appropriate large areas of land for 
food and non-food agricultural production. The evidence gathered so far with respect to 
community-related human rights violations and challenges needs to be expanded. In particu-
lar, there is a need for more cross-country studies. 
 Knowledge gaps 2.4.7
Much academic research has studied the so-called ‘political resource curse’, that is, the rela-
tion between commodity abundance and political failures such as autocracy, corruption, tax 
avoidance, violence and human rights violations. The debate is although still open and evi-
dence gathered so far needs to be expanded. With regards to the correlation between re-
source abundance and autocratic regimes, additional inquiries are needed to clarify causali-
ty. As to corruption, money laundering, and tax avoidance, further research should focus on 
the role of commodity abundance, since the findings are not necessarily related to the com-
modity sector. In the area of resources and conflict, evidence should be substantiated with 
indicators construed at the subnational level and information on low-intensity conflicts, and 
differentiated per commodity types.  
Regarding human rights violations in general, there is a need to trace ‘responsibility chains’ 
in order to focus the discussion on home country duties and business-related responsibilities. 
Much knowledge is still needed on the construction of value chains and the flow of invest-
ments: research is still a step behind in this respect, not least due to a persistent lack of 
transparency of investment flows. Finally, the sector would benefit from a mapping exercise 
taking stock of policy interventions adopted to address resource curse scenarios and evalu-
ating their effectiveness. In the words of Ross (2015, 253), in fact, “we have little systematic 
knowledge about which policies work and under what conditions. […] The need for evidence-
based policy advice is more urgent than ever.” (Ross 2015, 253). 
3. Commodity-Specific Local Impacts of the Commodity Sector in 
Developing Countries 
Commodity production is highly relevant for developing and emerging countries in the global 
South – particularly for commodity-dependent developing countries (CDDCs). It comes with 
many positive and negative externalities. The Swiss commodity sector is closely related to 
the commodity sectors of these countries, as the bulk of both hard and soft commodities is 
sourced from there. Accordingly, this section looks at local impacts resulting from commodity 
production in these countries. While section 2.4.6 gave an overview of literature offering 
general statements on local impacts relevant to human rights, this section outlines the state 
of research with regard to specific local impacts. We assess the availability of literature, the 
extent of existing knowledge, and the most pressing research needs from a sustainable de-
velopment perspective. In doing so, we focus on CDDCs in particular, and mainly consider 
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peer-reviewed papers published as of 1995, that is, in the last two decades. The most illus-
trative among these papers are referenced in the text; they do not represent the full range of 
available literature. Soft commodities discussed include coffee, cocoa, sugar, soy, cotton, 
palm oil, rubber, and timber. Hard commodities examined include copper, iron, aluminium, 
coal, gas, oil, and gold.28 
The results are presented in two main sections, the first relating to soft commodities and the 
second relating to hard commodities. Each of these sections is further divided into four sub-
sections: the first identifies and discusses positive and negative socio-economic (i.e. liveli-
hood) impacts; the second identifies and discusses positive and negative environmental im-
pacts; the third reviews existing governance mechanisms and assesses to which extent they 
promote positive and negative impacts of commodity extraction; and, finally, the fourth pre-
sents knowledge gaps. References in this section are numbered as a result of the systematic 
search approach taken. 
3.1 Soft commodities and their local impacts in developing coun-
tries 
Overall, we found some 150 papers dealing with local impacts of coffee, cocoa, rubber, palm 
oil, timber, cotton, soy, and sugar. The following subsections provide an overview of the live-
lihood, environmental, and governance impacts discussed. 
 Livelihood impacts 3.1.1
Relatively abundant information exists on how coffee [1-25], cocoa [25-43], rubber [44-65], 
and palm oil [44, 65-84] affect local livelihoods. The impacts discussed are mainly related to 
income generation, employment, and – to a lesser degree – to socio-economic differentia-
tion, land rights, and displacement and dispossession. By comparison, we found fairly little 
information on local socio-economic impacts of timber [43, 85-93], soy [94-98], cotton [99-
104], and sugar [105] production.  
A large share of the literature evaluates mixed systems managed by small- to medium-scale 
farmers. A main shared finding is that these diversified systems, as a survival strategy [70, 
75], have positive impacts on smallholders’ livelihoods and income generation; this has been 
shown mainly for mixed systems of rubber cultivation [44, 46, 47, 50-52, 56-59, 62, 64], palm 
oil production [70, 78, 80, 84], and timber plantation [43, 89-92]. In particular, ethnic minority 
groups have been found to benefit from mixed rubber cultivation [58, 59] to the extent that 
they outperform large state-managed farms.  
Much of the literature focuses on smallholders, investigating whether they have adapted their 
management practices and benefit from cash commodity production. Findings are ambiva-
lent and show that the adaptation of management practices often depends on the availability 
of governmental support, on the market structure, and on the characteristics of smallholder’s 
households and farms.  
Whether farmers are able to realize positive impacts of rubber and palm oil plantation as part 
of family and community farming, for example, depends strongly on effective government 
support (rubber: [45-48, 53, 54, 61, 65]; palm oil: [70, 72, 74, 80, 83, 106]). Critical issues 
include restricted access to processing infrastructure and to subsidized capital resources, 
                                                            
28  Annex 4 gives a detailed explanation of how we proceeded for the literature review.  
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limited availability of private credit for smallholder farm development, and market inefficiency 
[70, 80, 85, 106]. Further barriers are identified, such as informal and inequitable royalty dis-
tribution mechanisms (especially for timber revenues) or farmers’ unfamiliarity with the com-
modity (particularly oil palm) as a crop due to lack of knowledge and skills [82, 89, 91, 107].  
Regarding rubber plantations, Kenney-Lazar (2012) [49] presents a good overview of critical 
social, political, economic, and cultural impacts at local levels, in cases where they are based 
on large-scale concessions dispossessing small-scale producers of their land and common-
pool resources. The resulting commodification of land and labour hardly improves the basic 
conditions affecting their livelihoods. Regarding palm oil cultivation, a review of winners and 
losers is presented by Obidzinski et al. [82]. In the case of timber production practices, adap-
tation depends in particular on farm size and on both the availability of household labour and 
the inconsistency of farm income, including the obligation to pay taxes [92]. Interestingly, in 
the case of Benin, the level of taxation at both the national and decentralized levels (munici-
palities) seemed quite affordable in the timber value chain, especially for smallholder farmers 
[85]. Socio-economic differentiations are also reported among cocoa- and coffee-producing 
households [4, 5, 7, 32]. Knudsen and Fold (2011) [32] illustrate, based on Ghana’s cocoa 
sector, how a governmental purchasing system can secure both stable income from cocoa 
farming and access to land for small-scale farmers.  
Cash crop production is also related to migration and disputes over land, and may conflict 
with the production of food crops. Regarding cocoa and coffee farming, the literature dis-
cusses related dynamic migration patterns which stimulate deforestation, struggles over land 
between indigenous and migrant farmers, and how adoption of these cash crops can lead to 
the outmigration of youth [1, 5, 7, 11, 27, 32, 39, 40]. Some studies show how the cessation 
of such production systems can severely alter local livelihoods. Powell (2007) [105] de-
scribes how the closure of a sugar mill is reconstructing the livelihoods of former mill worker 
families, leading to emigration and a reduction in income, security, and access to social as-
sets. Competition of both rubber and palm oil with food production for self-sufficiency is a big 
challenge in China, Malaysia [44, 46, 47] and Indonesia [106]. Apart from these few studies, 
there is only little information about the effects of rubber plantation on food security, for ex-
ample, in other countries. 
The role of agricultural biotechnology in sustainable development and the shift of smallholder 
farming practices from conventional cotton to genetically modified hybrid cotton is also dis-
cussed controversially. Indeed, this is the main focus of the papers we found on cotton culti-
vation [100, 102-104]. Some papers maintain that modern technology adaptation among ru-
ral smallholder farmers has positive socio-economic effects, especially benefiting the poorer 
and more vulnerable farmers and hired female workers [103, 104]. Other authors argue that 
the benefits of conventional and organic cotton exceed those of systems based on genetical-
ly modified organisms (GMO) if compared under equal conditions [108]. Moreover, rapidly 
changing agricultural technology was also found to coincide with pests and lead to agricul-
tural deskilling at the farm level [103].  
A general worrisome trend observed for all soft commodities discussed here is that the im-
provement of livelihood assets is generally associated with a simultaneous increase in vul-
nerability to volatilities in the climate as well as in the prices of products, inputs, and labour. 
In addition, landowners’ rights and smallholders’ tenure and access to farmland often depend 
on unfair partnerships and corporate land deals with both commodity companies and states 
[49, 69, 71, 75, 77, 80, 82, 87, 89, 106].  
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Income and/or employment were discussed as the dominant local socio-economic impacts in 
five articles about soy farming [94-98], one about sugar production [105], 19 about cocoa 
[25-43], and 25 about coffee cultivation [1-25]. Results show a clear increase in small-scale 
farmers’ income as a result of soy production [96, 98], cocoa cultivation [26, 29, 32, 34, 35, 
37, 43], and coffee cultivation [6, 9, 10, 21, 24]. In many cases, it was not the original occu-
pants of small-scale soy farms who became successful at profitably farming soy [96, 98], but 
migrants who arrived later and had both greater organizational and technical skills and better 
financial resources. Socio-economic differentiation, class formation, tensions, and conflicts 
evolved due to local ethnic change and increasingly unequal allocation of land ownership 
and income [95, 98].  
Although soy, like other food crops such as cocoa and coffee, is considered an important 
livelihood asset, its profitability has been shown to largely depend on farm size, production 
costs, and topography, and is clearly lower on small-scale than on large-scale soy farms [96]. 
As a consequence, there is a tendency to shift to mechanized large-scale soy plantation, 
causing displacement and dispersion of rural communities and giving rise to land conflicts 
[94, 96-98].  
 Environmental impacts 3.1.2
The relatively well-documented cases of coffee [2, 5, 15, 17, 21, 22, 109-123], cocoa [26, 31, 
33, 38, 40, 41, 123-135], rubber [45-48, 56, 60, 64, 135-140], and palm oil [77, 82-84, 135, 
141-147] also report local environmental impacts.  
Studies on rubber and palm oil focus on the conversion of primary forests to plantations (also 
of other soft commodities such as cocoa and coconut). This generally has adverse impacts 
on biodiversity [47, 143, 145, 147] and soil fertility [82, 135, 138, 140]. Traditional and new 
agroforestry rubber systems are seen as the most sustainable solutions [45, 60, 135, 137, 
138], although it remains unclear whether they are merely an intermediary step towards 
monocultures, which would call into question their long-term potentials [135, 137, 138]. The 
literature shows that small-scale and family farmers have a greater potential for managing 
diversified rubber systems [139], but the economic viability of small-scale rubber and timber 
systems is comparatively low compared to large-scale monoculture plantations [136, 148]. In 
contrast, Sabastian et al. (2014) [92] found that wealthier farmers managed timber more sus-
tainably because they had more income and household labour available, enabling them to 
wait for revenue from growing trees.  
In the timber sector, illegal timber logging in natural forests poses a major environmental 
problem. Illegal logging causes deforestation, reduces biodiversity, and accelerates climate 
change. In addition, these illegal activities promote corruption, undermine sustainable forest 
management, and result in loss of revenue [91, 93, 107].  
Land-cover changes from natural or tropical forests to coffee, cocoa, soy, and sugar often 
have negative impacts on water quality, soil fertility, and organic carbon stocks [2, 5, 13, 22, 
26, 38, 110, 111, 122, 123, 134, 135, 149]. Nutrient depletion and subsequent soil degrada-
tion implies a considerable risk of long-term economic losses for farmers [123]. In the Ama-
zon Basin, the expansion of soy fields at the expense of tropical forests jeopardizes the hy-
drological balance and risks reducing water availability in the long term [149]. Diversified co-
coa and coffee farming based on traditional agroforestry is increasingly viewed as a sustain-
able land use practice which contributes to biodiversity conservation [15, 16, 31, 33, 34, 41, 
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114-117, 125-130]. In addition, the high proportion of shade trees in such systems is recog-
nized as crucial for minimizing the vulnerability of farmers’ livelihoods to droughts [133].  
These diversity assets are particularly relevant in view of the fact that cocoa and coffee 
farmers are exposed to growing volatilities, including climate change [36, 112]. However, the 
current trend towards cocoa and coffee intensification impacts heavily on plant diversity and 
biomass, and results in a loss of biodiversity [13, 17, 21, 33, 40, 109, 117, 124-126, 128, 
129]. Particularly the replacement of existing cocoa with new hybrid cocoa varieties that re-
quire less shade has been shown to cause a gradual shift from shaded agroforestry to sun-
grown cacao plantations, for example in Ghana [34, 40, 124]. Based on his research in Gha-
na, Ruf (2011) [40] suggests that the future of cocoa and timber possibly lies in “light com-
mercial-oriented agroforests” [40].  
 Governance implications 3.1.3
The literature on governance implications shows that strong, participatory government in-
volvement in the conversion of primary forests or agricultural areas into rubber and palm oil 
plantations has been more effective in balancing the needs of economic and social develop-
ment and agro-biodiversity conservation [48, 52, 64, 82-84] than neoliberal policies giving 
free rein to market forces [55]. However, the effectiveness of such government involvement 
depends very much on how it is structured. 
Some national and local government mechanisms against illegal timber logging, for example, 
have been assessed as inefficient [91, 93]. One study even found that governmental stake-
holders actually supported illegal wood sales via informal local cooperation [107]. In the tim-
ber sector, reducing livelihood dependence on timber by providing alternative sources of live-
lihood, particularly during off-farm work seasons, has been shown to effectively enhance 
both livelihoods and forest conservation [43, 93]. The best outcomes are expected if these 
measures are combined with the empowerment of local communities by involving them in 
participatory co-management of forest areas and reserves and by strengthening alliances 
between local communities and state forestry agencies [90]. 
Studies on coffee, cocoa, and soy suggest that effective participatory governmental process-
es are key to further incorporating peasants and indigenous groups into local policymaking. 
Market-driven agricultural reforms with low government involvement are generally considered 
to overlook trade-offs from cocoa and coffee production, such as crop pests and diseases, or 
migration and possible labour shortages [4, 5, 19, 23, 27]. The strong presence of a market 
forcing small-scale producers to achieve high outputsincreased the vulnerability of their live-
lihoods due to the limited degree of choice they had in the process [10]. Case studies on 
smallholder coffee-producing households in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Colombia, for ex-
ample, showed that even though they made a profit from their plantations, these families did 
not succeed in lifting themselves above the poverty line [4, 9, 15].  
While some scholars view the shift to specialty coffees, such as fair trade and organic, as an 
opportunity for small-scale producers to cope with the coffee crisis [4, 10] – an effect that has 
also been documented for cocoa [29] – others found no conclusive evidence of positive out-
comes of such production schemes on smallholders’ livelihoods [3, 15, 16]. Case studies on 
soy production in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay found that certification programmes failed 
to effectively integrate social and cultural concerns of small-scale soy farmers, whereas they 
reinforced close relationships between large-scale producers, government soy actors, and 
multinational soy corporations [94, 95]. Steward (2007) [97] offers a broad review of the so-
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cio-economic and environmental effects within soy agriculture perceived by Brazilian com-
munities. Her results suggest that the winners and losers of soy development and certifica-
tion schemes are largely determined by different understandings and valuations of forests 
and environmental degradation among stakeholders.  
 Knowledge gaps 3.1.4
After gaining an overview of the literature, we assessed our findings from a sustainable de-
velopment perspective. This revealed a number of knowledge gaps, some of which are out-
lined below. 
Too few studies deal with formal and informal local institutions, particularly land rights, and 
the question of what kinds of land rights-reforms can promote sustainable agricultural sys-
tems and sustainable commodity production. The impact of commodity production for export 
– and the associated rural transitions – on local people’s right to food is not sufficiently re-
searched either. This includes the question of how local power asymmetries between small-, 
medium-, and large-scale land owners, but also between gender, class, and ethnic groups 
are affected by these transitions. Conclusive long-term information about socio-economic 
outcomes and environmental impacts of the shift to GMO and hybrid seeds is lacking. More 
balanced information on certification-based involvement in niche markets would be helpful to 
assess the benefits of such markets. Likewise, medium- to long-term studies on the impact of 
high-input agro-industrial agriculture on local agrobiodiversity (including knowledge about in-
situ conservation) and on health issues are largely lacking. Further, in order to gain a more 
comprehensive picture, it would be necessary to better cover those soft commodities that 
have been less of a focus so far (see analysis above). 
Given the pivotal role of government involvement in sustainable agricultural transformation, 
there is not enough literature on best practices of governmental support and optimal partici-
patory processes from the point of view of local sustainable development impacts. Analysis is 
also needed to address the question of how domestic commodity markets would need to be 
shaped in order to promote sustainable local impacts, and how international governance – 
including the trade, investment, and tax regimes – would have to respond to such needs.  
3.2 Hard commodities and their local impacts in developing coun-
tries 
Overall, we found a fair amount of papers dealing with local impacts of copper, iron, alumini-
um, coal, gas, oil, and gold. The following subsections provide an overview of livelihood, en-
vironmental, and governance impacts discussed. 
 Livelihood impacts 3.2.1
The literature on impacts of hard commodity production on local livelihoods shows an ambiv-
alent picture: 39 papers deal with local livelihood impacts of gold mining [150-188], mainly 
reporting on gains in terms of income generation and employment [151, 152, 154-156, 159, 
163, 164, 166-169, 172, 175, 181, 185]. Comparatively little information exists on livelihood 
impacts of copper [186, 187, 189-192], coal [193-200], iron [188, 201, 202], and aluminium 
[24]. No suitable literature was found on local impacts of oil and gas. 
In general, the literature discusses both large-scale and small-scale mining activities, and 
both opencast and underground techniques. Regarding copper, iron, and coal, the focus has 
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been slightly more on large-scale than small-scale and on opencast than underground 
mines. In contrast, studies on gold extraction focus predominantly on artisanal and small-
scale mining, and to a lesser extent on large-scale mines. 
A commonly shared finding is that mining operations increased local income via both labour 
and compensations. However, only a small proportion of local villagers earn high financial 
returns. Community members are regularly engaged in jobs of a low technical level, as the 
majority are not trained for specialized mining jobs [185, 191, 202]. For this reason, mining 
corporations increasingly promote mechanization, and local villagers find themselves re-
placed by better trained people coming from further away [202]. Some studies observed that 
the potentially positive income and employment effects can cause poverty-plagued rural 
communities to engage in illegal operations [151, 166-168].  
Studies on gold mining in Africa [154, 155, 163, 164, 166-168, 172, 175, 185] illustrated that 
these self-initiated activities may have a positive downstream effect. Low-income farm 
households in particular are benefitting from income from gold artisanal and small-scale min-
ing activities during the off-farm season [166, 167, 175]. These survival strategies often con-
flict with national and global legislation and put at risk the health and lives of miners [154, 
161, 169, 180]. The coexistence of indigenous artisanal and small-scale mining groups and 
multinational large-scale mine operators may give rise to conflicts [169]. Creedy et al. (2006) 
[195] demonstrate how the replacement of artisanal and small-scale coal mining by large-
scale mines, operated by responsible mining corporations in China, can achieve essential 
improvements in health and safety, technology, environmental protection, and economic and 
social benefits to local communities.  
The literature shows that mining may pose a major threat to rural subsistence farmers, ethnic 
minorities, and forest communities relying on the natural environment for their livelihoods. 
Associated environmental damage (to cropland, river systems, and forests) and loss of land 
pose an indirect threat to local livelihoods [24, 177, 187, 189, 190]. Women in particular have 
reportedly lost their economic and social status as a result of resource extraction, often lead-
ing to their further marginalization and impoverishment [184, 201]. Contamination with mer-
cury and other chemicals used in both large- and small-scale gold extraction often has con-
siderable adverse impacts on local people’s health [153, 180, 203]. 
One paper on iron mining in India [202] and one on coal mining in China [193] show that after 
the closure of a large opencast mine and small-scale mines, respectively, local communities 
were no longer able to sustain their livelihoods from the natural surroundings.  
 Environmental impacts 3.2.2
A major environmental impact of hard-commodity mining is water pollution. Water contamina-
tion from mine tailings (surface and groundwater) is frequently observed for copper [204-
207], iron [205, 208], coal [198, 209], and gold [1, 2, 4, 7-9, 11, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 28, 34, 
39, 41, 50, 51, 54, 58, 62, 70-72, 75]. Another serious concern is the dispersion of surface 
contaminants by water and wind. This can result in elevated metal concentrations in down-
stream sediments, damaging lake and riverine ecosystems and water resources [204, 206, 
207, 210, 211]. Likewise, the exploitation of energy commodities has been shown to have 
negative impacts on soil quality [212-215]. In the case of gold extraction, contamination with 
mercury – generally used in artisanal and small-scale mining –is one of the most serious im-
pacts, affecting water quality, soils, and river sediments and reducing aquatic biodiversity 
[151, 153, 180, 203, 216-235]. Surface mining of copper [205], iron [205, 236], coal [198, 
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213], and gold [205, 225-227, 230, 233, 237-239], as well as gas drilling [240] cause critical 
levels of air pollution. Coal extraction has been shown to have negative effects on biodiversi-
ty regeneration owing to air pollution and resulting soil degradation [213, 215, 241]. Studies 
on indirect impacts of mining in Africa [177, 190] indicate extensive deforestation of rainfor-
ests near mines. All these elements cumulate in loss of agricultural lands [177, 187, 189, 
190, 214] and forest areas, resulting in a steady decrease in subsistence production and 
economic loss within the affected communities.  
Mishra (2009) [198], Bury (2004) [155], and Bury (2005) [156] present an exemplary discus-
sion of how coal mining impacts on livelihood assets. Their results suggest that the positive 
impacts on physical and social capital are for the short term only, whereas the negative im-
pacts on human and natural capital must be seen as long-term effects.  
 Governance implications 3.2.3
Quite a few studies deal with the impacts of mining on local governance mechanisms and 
examine conflicts arising from the clash of global and national interests with local interests in 
well-being [180, 189, 190, 199]. In the context of commodity extraction, endemic corruption, 
repression, and power asymmetries between small local elites and the majority of the local 
population are frequently observed phenomena. In general, strict top–down governance 
mechanisms tend to foment elite capture of benefits, avoiding adequate service to local 
needs [193, 199, 202]. The clash between national and local interests is often based on dif-
ferent understandings and views on nature and the use of commodities and the natural envi-
ronment.  
In order to bring the multiple trade-offs of hard-commodity production into an acceptable bal-
ance, many authors [189] advocate participatory processes between indigenous communi-
ties, mining companies, and the state, as well as the combination of formal and informal gov-
ernance arrangements [190]. The literature identifies a general need to improve governance 
mechanisms at all levels, as well as a need for institutional efforts to alleviate negative im-
pacts of a possible mine closure [190, 193, 194, 202]. Instruments assessed as effective in-
clude, for example, simplified registration processes, secured land ownership, a better un-
derstanding of the local setting, and artisanal mining practices [161, 180].  
Nevertheless, the negative impacts on social capital have been shown to persist even if the 
affected communities have secure land rights and receive compensation for lost assets. Ma-
terial compensation often fails to make up for their loss, resulting in a reduced standard of 
living [24, 169, 177, 198]. It has been demonstrated that the availability of cash can lead to 
excessive habitual drinking and indebtedness in the mining communities, as observed in the 
context of opencast coal mining in Malaysia [197]. Negative impacts often result in persistent 
local resistance and community mobilization, calling into question mining policies at the re-
gional, national, and global levels [155, 156, 182, 183, 185, 186].  
 Knowledge gaps 3.2.4
After gaining an overview of the literature, we assessed our findings from a sustainable de-
velopment perspective. This revealed a number of knowledge gaps, some of which are out-
lined below. 
There is a lack of evidence-based studies that give a comprehensive and comparative ac-
count of positive and negative effects of different forms of hard commodity extraction (small-
scale versus large-scale, opencast versus underground, etc.). Prospective studies of this 
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type should take account of the different social-ecological settings in which mining is prac-
ticed. The frequent orientation of research on either benefits or damage makes it difficult to 
derive general statements on local impacts resulting from the trade-offs between the main 
dimensions of local livelihoods.  
There is no doubt that hard-commodity extraction has adverse impacts on the local environ-
ment and natural resources, including biodiversity and water resources, destruction of land-
scapes, and increase in natural disasters. However, scientific knowledge on effective politi-
cal, legal, technological and organizational measures to best cope with these environmental 
externalities is not available. Likewise, the question of how to integrate diverging views on 
mining and the distribution of benefits between the mining enterprise and local communities 
– who often resist imposed development projects – remains an unanswered challenge, par-
ticularly in the context of large-scale surface gold mining. Overall, there is not enough litera-
ture on optimal participatory processes. 
Data availability is also insufficient with regard to concessions, fees, and taxes paid by inves-
tors; and whether this capital is invested for the benefit of local people has scarcely been 
analysed. Research is also needed on how domestic extractive markets and value chains 
would need to be shaped in order to promote sustainable local impacts, and on how interna-
tional governance – including the trade, investment, and tax regime – would have to respond 
to such needs.  
4. Rules and Regulations for Addressing Market Failures in Com-
modity Markets 
Market failures in commodity markets are often related to human rights and/or environmental 
law. Direct or indirect human rights violations and disregard of environmental standards re-
lated to the commodity sector occur mainly in host states where the commodity in question is 
extracted or grown. The responsibility to tackle these failures, however, lies equally with the 
host state, the home state, international governance, and business enterprises.  
This chapter provides an overview of existing hard law instruments and soft law initiatives 
aimed at either mitigating or preventing the occurrence of negative impacts on human rights 
and on the environment, which may have relevance for the commodity sector. After an ac-
count of the most significant general standards for the protection of human rights and the 
environment in section 4.1, section 4.2 will specifically examine existing international treaties 
on the protection and promotion of human rights (i.e. hard law instruments) and the wide 
range of voluntary initiatives and standards developed to facilitate the implementation of the 
benchmarks set in hard law instruments among businesses operating in the commodity sec-
tor. This will be followed by an analysis of the hard and soft law mechanisms that are rele-
vant for increasing the environmental performance of corporations in the commodity sector. 
Finally, section 4.4 will explore the potential of market structures, as shaped by investment, 
trade, and financial market rules and policies, for creating an environment conducive to sus-
tainable commodity extraction, production, processing and trading. The list is not intended to 
be exhaustive, and more ‘windows of reflection’ could be opened. Finally, the chapter identi-
fies main knowledge gaps.  
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4.1 General standards for the protection of human rights and the 
environment 
In addition to international treaties (see sections 4.2 and 4.3), there are a number of general 
standards which address a variety of issues in the realm of human rights and environmental 
protection. The UN Global Compact is a normative and aspirational standard that formulates 
10 broad principles aiming at corporate responsibility in the areas of human rights, working 
conditions, the environment, and anti-corruption. It targets organizations from the private sec-
tor and beyond and is not specific to the commodity sector. It is a voluntary standard to which 
companies may commit publicly by signature. While the Global Compact is often seen as the 
most successful international soft law initiative, it has come under increasing criticism of late. 
Most notably, Sethi and Schepers (2014) lament a persistent gap between lofty promises 
and actual performance of the Compact, which raises serious questions about its viability, 
usefulness, and continued existence. Supporters of the Global Compact have countered that 
such criticism rests on a flawed understanding of the Compact’s nature and purpose, inas-
much as it ignores, for instance, that the Compact seeks to supplement rather than replace 
state and non-state regulation (see e.g. Rasche 2009). Bernhagen and Mitchell (2010) attest 
a positive effect of the UN Global Compact on companies’ propensity to develop human 
rights policy statements. 
As mentioned in section 4.2.1, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are 
not specific to the commodity sector, but advance a due diligence standard for human rights 
respect applying to all companies, based on existing human rights treaties. Little can be said 
to date about the broad impact of the UN Guiding Principles on human rights. It appears that 
they have also gained considerable traction among businesses in the commodity sector, but 
there is little scholarly evidence to support that view. Lindsay et al. (2013) observe some 
progress in the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles in the oil and gas sector, but 
confirm that much remains to be done. To what extent the principles were successful in 
strengthening domestic legislation on business and human rights, particularly in CDDCs, 
remains to be explored.  
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are also not specific to the commodity 
sector. They cover a whole range of social and environmental issues and have largely 
adopted the human rights provisions of the UN General Principles. Similar to the former, 
there is little scholarly literature on the OECD Guidelines’ uptake and impact. However, as 
the OECD itself noted in its annual report for 2013, the update of the Guidelines afforded 
them a great deal of visibility, support, and uptake. The National Contact Point (NCP) review 
process established through the OECD Guidelines, in particular, is perceived to provide “a 
powerful tool to otherwise underrepresented indigenous peoples in the development context” 
(Bowman 2006). The OECD (2013b) observed a recent increase in complaints through 
NCPs and noted that a majority of such complaints relate to human rights, due diligence, 
supply chains, and stakeholder engagement. Further analysis of the effectiveness of the 
complaint mechanism as provided by the OECD Guidelines in the context of commodities 
would be welcome.  
The new Principles for Responsible Investments in Agriculture and Food Systems (RAI) of 
the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) (CFS, 2014) will be highly relevant to the soft-
commodity sector, as they establish a set of benchmarks for assessing whether investments 
in land and food are responsible and sustainable. Although they are soft law, their legitimacy 
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is high due to the CFS’s institutional relevance and also because a range of principles are 
deduced from binding human rights treaties and environmental agreements. The RAI Princi-
ples state that the question of whether an investment is responsible depends on its contribu-
tion to food security and nutrition (Principle 1); its contribution to sustainable and inclusive 
economic development and the eradication of poverty (Principle 2); whether it fosters gender 
equality and women’s empowerment (Principle 3); whether it engages youth (Principle 4); 
whether it respects tenure of land, fisheries, and forests, and access to water (Principle 5); 
whether natural resources are managed sustainably (Principle 6); whether cultural heritage is 
respected and diversity supported (Principle 7); whether safe and healthy agriculture and 
food systems are promoted (Principle 8); whether inclusive and transparent governance 
structures are incorporated (Principle 9); and whether impacts are assessed and addressed 
(Principle 10). Given the Principles’ recent adoption, it is up to future research to assess the 
extent to which this set of benchmarks has shaped investment practices and policies, and to 
identify ways in which they might be integrated in existing regulatory regimes, such as the 
trade or investment regime (see section 4.4).  
4.2 Enabling environment for human rights 
 Human Rights Standards and Joint Responsibility 4.2.1
The two international human rights covenants – the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights29 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights30 – and 
a range of specific international human rights treaties31 – including the Conventions of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO)32 – constitute the international human rights frame-
work. They are widely accepted, as they have been ratified by most states from the global 
North as well as the global South.33 These international agreements state the duty of state 
parties to respect, protect, and fulfil (including remedy) human rights. The primary duty lies 
with the state where the violation takes place; but states that are otherwise involved must 
ensure that their own activities do not result in human rights violations abroad. This includes 
the duty to provide for a ‘human-rights-enabling’ environment which promotes investments 
that are conducive to human rights and hinders unconducive investments. This becomes 
                                                            
29  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into 
force 23 March 1976.  
30  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by UNGA resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into force 3 
January 1976, in accordance with article 27.  
31  Among them are, inter alia, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families; the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Most of these treaties come with additional Optional 
Protocols.  
32  Eight are the so-called ‘fundamental’ ILO conventions covering subjects that are considered fundamental prin-
ciples and rights at work: freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargain-
ing; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. These principles are also covered in 
the ILO's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998. The 2008 ILO Declaration on 
Social Justice for a Fair Globalization also identified four ‘governance’ conventions relating to tripartism, em-
ployment policy and labour inspection as priority instruments (ILO 2015).  
33  According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for instance, have been ratified by 
168 and 164 States respectively (OHCHR 2015).   
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relevant, for example, when states negotiate investment, trade, and tax agreements; but it 
also has an impact on how development aid is implemented. The de facto impacts brought 
about by these agreements or by development aid should not result in human rights viola-
tions, but should rather promote a ‘conducive’ or ‘enabling’ environment that encourages 
sustainable development and the realization of human rights, thus ensuring policy coher-
ence.  
Further, both host and home states (see section 2.1) have a binding duty to protect human 
rights, which includes an obligation to ensure that ‘their’ business enterprises – companies 
who have a production site or headquarters within their territory – act in a way that is con-
sistent with human rights, be it at home or abroad.34 This is related to the “corporate respon-
sibility to respect human rights” that business enterprises bear as such (Ruggie 2011, Chap-
ter II). According to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Ruggie, 
2011) - which interpret existing human rights obligations included in the international human 
rights covenants and ILO-conventions - this responsibility entails the following foundational 
principle:  
Business enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid in-
fringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts 
with which they are involved. (Ruggie 2011, II.A.11) 
This requires that business enterprises exercise due diligence: 
In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse hu-
man rights impacts, business enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence. 
(Ruggie 2011, II.A.17) 
In the commodity sector, this responsibility calls for due diligence when leasing land (by tak-
ing due account of the impact a large investor’s presence may have on future land reforms); 
when negotiating concessions with the government (by striving for balanced and transparent 
contracts, including fair tax contributions and employment opportunities); when resorting to 
security forces (by making sure that they are adequately controlled); and in many other re-
spects. Altogether, the ensuring of human rights promoting policies also reduces the exist-
ence of reputational risks, particularly for home countries.  
In order to improve systems, target, and transformation knowledge (Messerli et al. 2013) 
concerning the relationship between commodity operations in countries of the global South 
and human rights, it is important to understand whether general and specific local impacts as 
summarized in sections 2 and 3 amount to human rights violations, whether effective legal 
instruments to protect populations from such violations exist, whether they are implemented 
effectively, and whether victims successfully make use of them by means of adjudication. 
Both country-specific studies and comprehensive comparative studies assessing these ques-
tions in a systematic way are lacking. We refrain from referring to specific international and 
national jurisprudence in this respect, as this would require more in-depth investigations. 
While the hard law standards reflected in the diverse international agreements provide the 
needed benchmarks, many soft law (voluntary) and private standards have been developed 
                                                            
34  See De Schutter  et al. (2012, Maastricht Principle 24, Commentary 2): “The duty of the state to protect human 
rights by regulating the conduct of private actors extends to situations where such conduct may lead to viola-
tions of human rights in the territory of another state.” Ruggie, in his guiding principles, has formulated it more 
cautiously: “States should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territo-
ry and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.” (Ruggie 2011, para. 2). 
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to promote the implementation of these benchmarks. This section focuses on both, by high-
lighting (and assessing the effectiveness of) existing initiatives and standards aimed at either 
mitigating or preventing the occurrence of negative impacts on human rights and on the envi-
ronment.  
This human rights reasoning is close to the debate on policy coherence for development 
(PCD) – resp. policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) – which is gaining mo-
mentum in OECD countries, not least due to the forthcoming Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). Many questions regarding PCD are still unresolved, particularly the question 
of how compliance with PCD standards can best be measured and monitored. Different Eu-
ropean countries have engaged in designing such monitoring systems, including Switzerland 
(Van Seters et al. 2015). However, in-depth academic literature on PCD-methodology is still 
lacking35.  
Finally, inasmuch as the protection of fundamental human rights amounts to a Common 
Concern, and given the lack of appropriate institutions at the global or regional level in this 
area, it has been argued that States should bear as a matter of principle an obligation to act 
beyond the scope of territorial application of their national laws to ensure protection of fun-
damental human rights (Cottier et al. 2009; 2012; 2014). The emerging principle of Common 
Concern would assist in explaining and defining the scope and limits of extraterritorial appli-
cation of national laws in the pursuit of solutions to shared problems such as the protection of 
human rights, thereby generating appropriate incentives for others to join an international 
effort of co-operation in the long run (ibid.).  
 Creating a human-rights-friendly environment: existing initiatives and stand-4.2.2
ards 
A regulatory environment which is conducive to human rights ensures, among other things, 
that good governance principles, including principles of inclusive participation (e.g., free, in-
formed and prior consent in the context of relocations), are respected; that revenues from 
commodity production or extraction are shared fairly so that local people enjoy appropriate 
levels of income; and that local people are sufficiently and adequately involved. The following 
standards point in this direction.36 
a) Transparency  
A major governance challenge regularly experienced in relation to commodity production and 
extraction is corruption and bribery. Investors and host governments are often directly in-
volved in these practices (see section 2.4.2). It is nowadays widely accepted that the home 
states of investors and financial capital, as well as the international community, are called on 
counteracting this problem.  
Recent efforts to combat corruption and bribery have focused on increasing transparency 
regarding payments to home and host governments, government agencies, and state-owned 
companies. There are a number of regulatory approaches as well as voluntary standards and 
initiatives which address the problem of transparency of financial flows. The authoritative 
                                                            
35  For an account of PCD and soft commodities with relation to Switzerland, see Lein, de Roquefeuil and Van 
Seters (2014).  
36  While primarily human rights related, it is still not clear to what extent these standards may also be used to 
protect the environment. 
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standards with regard to transparency of payments are currently the US Dodd-Frank Act, the 
more recent EU legislation, and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
EITI, the pre-eminent ‘soft law’ measure for securing transparency, has mainly received posi-
tive appraisals. However, there are also critical reactions pointing out that EITI, though effec-
tive in harnessing transparency, might be limited in its capacity to promote accountability 
(Caspary 2012; Short 2014). Kolstad and Wiig (2009) argued that EITI’s emphasis on reve-
nues rather than on expenditures seems misplaced. Further, it has been suggested that 
some governments adhering to EITI have not allowed civil society to participate fully in the 
process or have not consistently provided civil society with the information it would need to 
hold its government accountable (Aaronson 2011). A further objection has been that EITI 
primarily works to create the illusion that the West is ‘helping’, masking the fact that the 
pressing problems of the commodity sector persist (Bracking 2009). Perhaps the most sys-
tematic overview of the effectiveness of EITI was provided by Corrigan (2014). Her study 
suggests that the EITI strengthens economic development, government effectiveness, and 
regulation quality, but only feebly contributes to controlling corruption, and thus fostering de-
mocracy-building and political stability. Regarding the ‘environmental potential’ of EITIs, see 
section 4.3.2. 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), also a voluntary initiative aimed at increasing the 
transparency of corporations, NGOs as well as public agencies through reporting, has re-
ceived mixed evaluations. Contributions range from more critical assessments which consid-
er the GRI mainly as a means to camouflage corporations’ bad conduct (Moneva et al. 2006) 
to those who regard it as a rather successful, albeit not perfect, initiative (Levy et al. 2010). 
These inconclusive assessments suggest that further research is needed to advance under-
standing of whether and how the GRI is able to prevent specific issues such as corruption or 
child labour. This plea can be extended to voluntary principles such as the Business Princi-
ples for Countering Bribery developed by Transparency International, which have not yet 
been investigated scientifically. 
As to relevant hard law instruments, both the USA (i.e. Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act) 
and the EU (i.e. EU Accounting and Transparency directives) have stepped up the home 
country transparency requirements for extractive companies. Many studies conceive Dodd-
Frank as a pertinent means to increase transparency in the global supply chain (Matfess 
2012; Reilkoff 2014). Though seen by many as a first step in the right direction, critical com-
mentators have warned that the influence of Dodd-Frank is limited due to its geographical 
focus on the US context, its tendency to hamper the competitive advantage of firms due to 
social and human rights disclose (Sarfaty 2013) and the partial inability of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission to implement Dodd-Frank (and its amendments) in a timely, ef-
fective and efficient manner (Matfess 2012). 
The EU accounting and transparency directives regulate the disclosure of payments such as 
taxes on profits, license fees, and royalties. Critical comments hold that these directives will 
not remedy the resource curse and will not provide adequate transparency on revenues 
(Rees, 2014). While the academic debate is still nascent, there are numerous articles by 
NGOs as well as government departments and officials which address the potential and pit-
falls of the EU directives in the Swiss context (McNeil and Drye 2013). Among other things, it 
has been suggested that political decision-makers have been too reluctant in developing 
binding transparency regulations, notably as concerns transparency of financial flows be-
tween commodity traders and purchasers in developed countries and government authorities 
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in developing countries (Foraus 2014). On the other hand, Ethos and Transparency Interna-
tional contend that Switzerland has taken strong measures to combat corruption, even 
though it is acknowledged that much is still to be done before corruption is effectively inhibit-
ed (see e.g. Rybi and Lonchamp 2914). Future research is needed to put these divergent 
viewpoints into perspective. 
b) Illicit financial flows 
Another governance challenge frequently related to commodity production and extraction is 
that revenues are not shared fairly between the investor, the host state, the local community, 
and the home state. Besides the above-mentioned transparency standards, measures to 
combat illicit financial flows, for example due to tax avoidance or money laundering, aim at 
improving this situation (see section 1.2.4, Box 2). This section is not intended to be exhaus-
tive; extensive overviews of the problem of illicit financial flows have been provided else-
where, for example by Thut (2014). 
c) Tax avoidance 
As the international common principles to share tax jurisdiction have not kept pace with the 
changing business environment (OECD 2013), several measures have been developed to 
prevent tax avoidance (and tax eviction). The OECD has spearheaded this process. The 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Companies admonish enterprises to commit themselves 
to cooperation, transparency, and tax compliance. Despite being seen by some as an effec-
tive means for guaranteeing tax justice (Santer 2011), the OECD Guidelines are also criti-
cized for their non-binding nature, the vagueness of their suggestions, and the lack of en-
forcement mechanisms (Oshionebo 2013).  
The OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative (BEPS) has been designed as a com-
prehensive global action plan to realign international standards with the current global busi-
ness environment. Some scholars see the BEPS as a valuable initiative for transforming the 
transfer policies for governments (Ashley 2013). However, it has also been suggested that 
the BEPS does not propose concrete solutions. Hence, despite its being ambitious, commen-
tators have taken issue with the actual impact the BEPS has on international tax regimes 
(Ross and Herrinton 2013). 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Corporations and Tax Administration 
are another measure designed to create a level playing field between different types of com-
panies and help prevent taxable profits from being shifted out of the appropriate jurisdiction. 
So far, there is no scientific research on the impact and effectiveness of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. The Tax Justice Network, together with the Association for Accountancy and 
Business Affairs (AABA), has developed its own Code of Conduct for Taxation (cf. Murphy 
2007), which, however, has not been subject to academic inquiry. 
While multilateral binding tax agreements – which would improve tax transparency and limit 
international tax competition – are (still) lacking, states often regulate tax issues on a bilateral 
level by concluding double taxation agreements (DTAs). In doing so, they often follow OECD 
and UNCTAD recommendations. The potential of DTAs is not yet fully exploited. Regarding 
the commodity sector, investors often operate in countries with which their home state has 
no DTA or a fragmented or unbalanced DTA in place. This is also true of Swiss-based inves-
tors. Comprehensive literature on best practices regarding DTAs and on how to use their full 
45 
 
potential is lacking (for a comprehensive study on Swiss DTAs and developing countries, see 
Bürgi Bonanomi and Meyer-Nandi 2014). 
d) Money laundering 
A further, related challenge that is often linked to the commodity sector is money laundering 
(see section 2.4.2). A common instrument in the fight against money laundering is the crimi-
nalization of such acts by means of laws and guidelines. Le Billon (2011) points out that most 
initiatives designed to address governance issues in the extractive industry have failed to 
take into account the problem of illicit financial flows such as money laundering. Tsingou 
(2005) further mentions that existing regimes against money laundering do not necessarily 
reduce the risk of money laundering, but rather serve the aim of relieving competitive pres-
sures from financial centres. 
The initiative against money laundering published by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
seeks to identify countries that have deficient or non-existent laws against money laundering, 
as well as to support countries in implementing measures against money laundering. Albert 
(2014) maintains that FATF’s recommendations might help Switzerland fix the problems re-
lated to its financial-centre policy, including the laws made for regulating money laundering 
cases. One of the main problems related to FATF’s recommendations is that many national 
jurisdictions are not compliant with them. This could lead to the undesired result of regulatory 
arbitrage, which among other things increases the likelihood of money laundering activities 
(Choo 2014). However, an evaluation by the FATF (2009) concludes that Switzerland has 
taken adequate steps in the fight against money laundering. 
A key regulatory mechanism in the fight against money laundering is the Swiss Anti-Money 
Laundering Act. While seen by many as a worthwhile endeavour (Belleyguier 2003), the Anti-
Money Laundering Act is limited in its scope as it is not applicable to proprietary trading. A 
conspicuous feature of existing research is that it has not yet addressed the Act’s effective-
ness in preventing money laundering in a systematic way. The same applies to Art. 305bis of 
the Swiss Criminal Code, another hard law instrument in the fight against money laundering.  
 Workplace-related human rights violations 4.2.3
International employment standards are mainly provided by the various ILO Conventions, 
along with the related human rights standards as included in human rights treaties. The re-
spective knowledge gaps were discussed in section 2.4.6.  
Most corporate responsibility standards, such as the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guide-
lines for Multinational Companies, or SA8000, also address the problem of child and forced 
labour. However, little specific information is available on their impact in the commodity sec-
tor. The ILO (2014) has reported that child labour was generally reduced by 30% worldwide 
between 2000 and 2012. The impact of the two ILO child labour conventions37 is perceived 
as significant but insufficient to actually eliminate child labour completely (ILO 2014). Despite 
the prevalence of child and forced labour in the commodity sector, studies investigating this 
problem specifically in the commodity sector and scientific assessments of the impact of dif-
ferent standards addressing it remain scarce. 
                                                            
37  These are the Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment of 1973 and the Con-
vention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour of 1999. At the end of 2010, these Conventions had been 
ratified by, respectively, 168 and 179 member States of the ILO. 
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 Security forces and conflicts 4.2.4
The use of potentially abusive private and public security forces, according to McBeth (2008: 
129) leads to “the most common form of serious human rights violation in the course of mul-
tinational extractive industries” and, accordingly, has been under increasingly heavy scrutiny 
by civil society (Freeman et al. 2001). In 2000, the Voluntary Principles for Security and Hu-
man Rights (VPs), an operational and detailed standard (Freeman et al. 2001) that deals with 
the security arrangements of extractive companies, were established as a multi-stakeholder 
effort to address such human rights violations. While their actual impact is difficult to meas-
ure, scholars have stated that, for example in Colombia, the VPs have contributed signifi-
cantly to foster an understanding of the need for human rights controls on security forces as 
well as to facilitate a dialogue between companies and human rights NGOs (Guáqueta 
2013). Guáqueta (2013) asserts that “although corporations are not single-handedly reducing 
overall nationwide human rights violations in Colombia, their actions are important” for ad-
vancing the process of democratization and peace-building. Furthermore, irrespective of its 
impact on reducing abuse, the very process of developing the Code, as Freeman et al. 
(2001) point out, was important to generate a shared understanding of the actual problems 
and issues the companies are dealing with.  
The issue of armed and violent conflicts in the commodities sector has frequently led to dis-
cussions about the relative benefits and effectiveness of voluntary and mandatory traceability 
and due diligence standards. The assessment of recently implemented hard law approaches 
yields mixed results. For example, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank consumer protection act 
addresses the issue of conflict minerals. Specifically, it requires American companies to re-
port to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on whether any minerals used for 
their products were sourced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or its neighbour-
ing countries, and on what measures they are taking to trace the origin of these minerals. 
Companies which can show that their sourcing practices do not directly or indirectly benefit 
or finance armed groups can use the ‘DRC conflict free’ label for their products. Vermeulen 
(2014) asserts that the provision has caused both companies and consumers to become 
more critical about sourcing practices and has led to tangible reforms in Africa’s Great Lakes 
region. Others lament that the effects of Dodd-Frank 1502 have been devastating, especially 
for Congolese artisanal miners and their families (see Seay 2012).  
In the diamond industry, the Kimberly process is a much-discussed voluntary initiative. It co-
vers 98% of trade in diamonds and is commonly positively received. There is broad agree-
ment that the initiative has reduced the amount of conflict minerals in the world market (see 
e.g. De Voe 2011). However, the success of the certification scheme has never been entirely 
uncontested, and especially the structure of the process as well as its non-binding character 
– that is, its lack of enforcement – has been subject to ongoing critique (Durnovich 2014). As 
Grant (2011) shows in the examples of Angola and Sierra Leone, active engagement with 
the initiative (Sierra Leone) can go a long way in improving governance as well as bolstering 
exports of rough diamonds, while a passive approach (Angola) may have a stagnating effect 
in such regards. Although the relationship between commodities and conflict is overall not 
under-researched, there is scope for deepening the existing knowledge. 
 Land appropriation 4.2.5
Another heated debate focuses on the issue of land appropriation. Land appropriation by 
foreign direct investors in the global South – be it through lease or ownership – has in-
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creased over the past years (see the Landmatrix database), particularly due to an increased 
demand for soft commodities, including biofuels. The debate is conducted under the labels of 
‘large-scale land acquisition’ (LSLA) or ‘land grabbing’, and centres on challenges regarding 
land rights, inclusive participation, and inclusive investment. While existing human rights 
treaties cover a range of related questions, implementation is often very weak (Golay and 
Biglino 2013). The recently adopted FAO Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure (FAO 2012), 
despite their voluntary character, assembles standards which are partly related to binding 
human rights, by interpreting them as relevant in such contexts. There are quite a few case 
studies on LSLA (see section 3.1), but comparative cross-country studies on the effective-
ness of the Voluntary Guidelines are still lacking. The same is true of studies assessing the 
relations between LSLAs and underlying market structures (see section 4.4). 
4.3 Protection of the environment 
In addition to the above-mentioned human rights challenges, a regulatory environment con-
ducive to sustainable development must ensure that environmental resources are protected 
to the largest possible extent. As discussed in section 3, many of the negative environmental 
impacts currently discussed in conjunction with the commodity sector are related to resource 
extraction or production. It would be wrong, however, to conceive of negative environmental 
impacts as the sole problem and responsibility of host states and corporations who are di-
rectly involved in extractive or productive activities. Corporations involved in commodity trad-
ing and logistics, including their home states, also bear responsibility for negative environ-
mental impacts, as their supply chain links them with activities pertaining to commodity ex-
traction and production. The same goes for the human rights area, moreover, the principle of 
Common Concern also applies to environmental governance (see section 4.2.1).  
Existing initiatives aimed at mitigating or eradicating the negative environmental impacts of 
the commodity sector encompass both soft law and hard law mechanisms. They address a 
host of different environmental issues, such as water pollution, natural hazards air quality, 
deforestation, biodiversity, and the use of toxic substances. Many environmental initiatives 
also tackle social issues related, for example, to people’s health and livelihoods, soil fertility 
in farmers’ land, and public consultation of local communities. This dual focus acknowledges 
that the commodity sector’s social and environmental impacts are inextricably intertwined. 
Key areas of concern can be clustered as: (1) air, soil, and water pollution, natural hazards 
and related harmful effects on natural habitats, biodiversity, and the climate; (2) noise and 
visual impacts on landscapes; (3) destruction of sites of cultural, recreational, and social val-
ue; and (4) impairment of public health, safety, and the livelihoods of local (indigenous) 
communities. 
There is a range of widely accepted multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and soft 
law standards which may become relevant in a given case. However, to date there are no 
comprehensive, universally accepted hard law mechanisms for tackling the specific (nega-
tive) environmental impacts of the commodity sector.38 Besides international treaties, initia-
tives include a host of different – and at times conflicting – soft law recommendations, indus-
try-specific codes, national regulations, environmental management systems, as well as la-
belling and certification initiatives. This fragmentation has prevented the development of 
                                                            
38  There are some specific commodity agreements, such as the International Cocoa Agreement of 2010. Their 
effect on sustainability parameters still needs to be examined. 
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more concerted and effective ways of dealing with the commodity sector’s negative environ-
mental impacts. On a more positive note, recent tendencies towards convergence and inter-
national harmonization have become palpable (Holzinger et al., 2008). The following two 
subsections focus exclusively on those soft and hard law mechanisms that, theoretically 
speaking, are directly relevant for increasing the environmental performance of corporations 
in the commodity sector.  
 Hard law mechanisms for tackling negative environmental impacts 4.3.1
Hard law involves mechanisms on both the international and national level. As mentioned, 
the former encompass MEAs, general principles, statutes, as well as customary law which 
stipulate environmentally motivated hortatory provisions with regards to the sustainable 
management of natural resources and, sometimes, recommendations to conduct environ-
mental impact assessments (Espoo, 1991).  
The United National Environmental Programme (UNEP), and in particular its Division of Envi-
ronmental Law and Conventions (DELC), has spearheaded the development of environmen-
tal law. DELC’s main objective consists of implementing environmental law across different 
sectors and levels of governance. Widely accepted multilateral treaties that may become 
relevant in a commodity context include the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), the 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal, and the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. However, there is a lack of 
meta-analytical studies assessing to what extent the diverse international environmental law 
regimes affect the environmental performance of corporations in the commodity sector. This 
includes the question to what extent the legal instruments provided under these regimes can 
be used in an effective way by victims seeking redress.  
On the national level, hard law mechanisms mainly involve laws and regulations which, if 
breached, lead to sanctions. Among the countries that have adopted national environmental 
laws specifically targeting the commodity sector are Canada, Norway and Australia. Most 
CDDCs may also have more or less stringent environmental regulations in place, whereas 
implementation of these laws is often a major challenge. Current discussions concerning 
hard law mechanisms have thus focused on the enforceability of existing standards 
(Blondiau & Rousseau, 2009). An alternative mechanism for motivating corporations towards 
more environmentally friendly behaviours is the establishment of incentive systems that re-
ward ecological initiatives, improvements, or investments. However, it will be the task of pro-
spective research to establish how national and transnational hard law mechanisms affect 
the sustainability performance of corporations in the commodity sector. 
 Soft law mechanisms for tackling negative environmental impacts 4.3.2
Several generic soft law mechanisms bear significance for commodity firms: among them are 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performances Standards, the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises, the Global Compact, and the Equator Principles. 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), an international financial institution that encour-
ages private sector development in developing countries and a member of the World Bank 
Group, addresses, via its Performance Standards (IFC, 2012), various environmental issues. 
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Specifically, Performance Standards 1, 3, 6, and 7 call on commodity firms to carry out as-
sessments of their projects’ environmental impacts and risks, to engage with local communi-
ties on environmental issues, to manage the environmental performance of their projects 
throughout the entire lifecycle, to employ environmentally friendly technologies, to use re-
sources sustainably, to secure biological diversity, and to protect indigenous peoples from 
exposure to hazardous materials. Despite their considerable popularity, the IFC Performance 
Standards have not yet been studied with regard to their effectiveness in promoting commod-
ity corporations’ ecological sustainability. 
The OECD Guidelines stipulate that corporations should contribute to “environmental pro-
gress with a view to achieving sustainable development” (OECD 2011, 14). To accomplish 
sustainable development, corporations are supposed to apply sound standards of disclosure, 
accounting, and audit. Although the level of adherence to the OECD Guidelines has been 
evaluated (Bussler and Fonari, 2005), there is no evidence so far as to whether and how the 
OECD guidelines influence the environmental performance of corporations in the commodity 
sector. 
Environmental considerations form one of the four pillars of the Global Compact. In its Prin-
ciples 7, 8 and 9, the Global Compact obliges corporations to endorse a precautionary ap-
proach towards environmental challenges, to promote environmental responsibility, and to 
develop and use environmentally friendly technologies. Research on the impact of the Global 
Compact, which mainly addresses national governments, on corporations operating in the 
commodity sector has so far been missing. 
The Equator Principles (2006, 2012, 2013) address commodity firms, albeit not directly, 
through the financial institutions which fund commodity firms’ projects. Financial institutions 
that endorse the Equator Principles commit themselves to ensuring that the projects they 
finance are environmentally sound. This essentially means that the projects being financed 
recognize the importance of climate change and biodiversity, and thus actively try to avoid or 
at least mitigate negative impacts on the ecosystem and the climate. Assessments of the 
effectiveness of the Equator Principles are rather positive (e.g. Ong 2010). However, critical 
appraisals also exist. Wright (2012), for instance, points out that the Equator Principles have 
not stopped the financing of projects with high environmental costs. Further, it has been con-
tended that a precise assessment of the Equator Principles is difficult to attain as it is hardly 
possible to determine whether banks changed their lending practices due to the Equator 
Principles or due to their own environmental strategies (Macve and Chen, 2010). The direct 
linkage between the Equator Principles and the sustainability performances of commodity 
corporations has not been studied scientifically. 
Apart from these generic mechanisms, there are various standards which directly address 
the environmental impacts of the commodity sector or, more precisely, of particular subindus-
tries of the commodity sector. An exhaustive overview of the different standards and labelling 
initiatives is beyond the scope of this document. Suffice to say that IPIECA, the global oil and 
gas industry association for environmental and social issues, offers an exemplary model of a 
specific environmental standard. Specifically, IPIECA offers corporations in the oil and gas 
industry guidance in improving their sustainability performance, notably by means of a con-
sistent approach to estimating their greenhouse emissions (Ritter 2004). The available litera-
ture is still mainly concerned with technical and managerial issues. Thus, whether IPIECA 
might eventually increase the ecological performance of corporations in the oil and gas in-
dustry still needs to be established by means of empirical research. The same applies to 
50 
 
most other environmental standards designed for specific subindustries of the commodity 
sector. There are thus only very few investigations that testify to the effectiveness of volun-
tary standards. One example includes research on various standards, including the Forest 
Stewardship Council or the Common Code for the Coffee Community, which did reveal a 
positive effect on the protection of natural resources (as stipulated by the Millennium Devel-
opment Goal No. 7; cf. BMZ 2008). 
A small body of research deals with the effectiveness of environmental management sys-
tems and norms, such as relevant International Standardization Organization (ISO) stand-
ards or the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) developed by the European Com-
mission. For instance, a study in the copper mining industry revealed that adoption of ISO 
140011 did in fact improve the eco-efficiency of certain companies (Tole & Koop, 2013). Yet, 
it has been suggested that organizations adopting such management systems are often ex-
clusively concerned with waste reduction and hence miss out on increasing the overall sus-
tainability of their production processes. 
Regarding transparency standards such as EITI (see section 4.2.2), the extent to which such 
standards could be used to ensure systematic disclosure of environmental information, such 
as environmental impact assessments of enterprises and governments, still remains an open 
question. The same holds true for other, primarily human rights-related, soft law standards 
discussed in section 4.2.2. 
4.4 Market regulation as an entry point: investment, financial mar-
ket, trade 
The relationship between market-related regulation and sustainable commodity production is 
an underexplored field of research. Its underlying assumption is that, to be sustainable (and 
hence sound in terms of human rights and environmental protection), commodity extraction, 
production, processing, and trading require well-targeted market regulation and policies, in-
cluding investment, trade and financial market rules, conducive to creating an enabling envi-
ronment for sustainable development.  
Investment regulation, for example, should provide incentives for responsible investments 
and hinder irresponsible investments. In this respect, there is a need to discuss the role of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and other international investment treaties. Discussion on 
how to better balance rights and duties as laid down in these agreements is ongoing (e.g. 
UNCTAD 2012c). Generally, BITs have focused on the protection of investors’ rights in host 
states. However, there are a number of real concerns in relation to commodity extraction and 
trade. As it has been understood since Vernon’s (1971) discussion of the ‘obsolescing bar-
gain’, host governments have an incentive to renegotiate contract terms once an investor has 
begun operations. This is especially true in relation to hard commodity extraction activities, 
but also applies to soft commodity investments. The threat of legal action under international 
investment agreements (IIAs) may discourage this. Only relatively recent IIAs have begun to 
address the right of host countries to regulate on environmental, labour, and social issues, 
which are omnipresent in commodity investments (Vinũales 2012). In most existing IIAs, in-
cluding those of Switzerland, regulation in these areas ran the risk of sparking a dispute with 
investors. Even very recent IIAs do not envisage an active role for home states in enforcing 
domestic transparency standards on outward-investing firms in relation to tax payments or 
government contracts. A home country might take this up under the rubric of expanded co-
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operation between home and host governments, where it is commonly identified as a treaty 
objective albeit seldom implemented. Treaties negotiated in the future represent an oppor-
tunity to step up current disciplines in this respect. Future treaties could also incorporate or 
refer to benchmarks of responsible investments as set out for example by the RAI Principles 
(see section 4.1). Best regulation and practices still need to be identified. 
Regarding financial markets regulation, the extent and impact of derivatives trading related to 
commodities is a matter of debate. It very much relates to the question of whether and, if so, 
to what extent speculation may become harmful and increase price volatility (see section 
2.3.4). Bass (2013) suggests that, in order to take a precautionary approach, speculation 
must be limited via hard law. A hard law measure aimed at combating speculation is, for in-
stance, the Volcker rule in the Dodd-Frank Act. Yet, researchers have pointed out that the 
Dodd-Frank Act will not have a significant impact on commodity firms because it focuses 
exclusively on banks (Barth and McCarthy 2013). In Switzerland, a particularly powerful 
means of fighting speculation has been proposed in an initiative launched by the Social 
Democratic Party youth wing. If successful, the initiative would prohibit speculative activities 
of Swiss-based commodity companies. An overview of discussed measures can be found in 
Mugglin (2014) and in Lein, de Roquefeuil and Van Seters (2014). While the political debate 
in this area is still under way, research will have to assess – ex ante and ex post – the effec-
tiveness of anti-corruption measures taken by the government.  
The discussion on how trade regulation and sustainable development – including sustainable 
investment – relate to each other is ongoing. It centres on questions such as the following: to 
what extent does existing trade regulation allow for sustainability market incentives (de 
Schutter, forthcoming)? How could the trade regime incorporate standards of responsible 
investment such as those incorporated into the RAI Principles? What is the optimal degree of 
commodity export dependence? How can the trade regime ensure adequate domestic policy 
space? (de Schutter 2009)? To what extent are market incentives applied which relate to the 
value chain (e.g. tariff escalation) and do they affect where processing of commodities takes 
place (see section 1.2)? How can the impacts of trade rules on human rights and the envi-
ronment in commodity contexts be assessed in an optimal way, either ex ante or ex post 
(Bürgi Bonanomi 2014; regarding the challenges related to the WTO Agreement on Agricul-
ture, see Bürgi Bonanomi 2015)? Literature examining such ‘linkages’ is still fairly scarce, 
and much interdisciplinary research is still required (see e.g. the SNF funded R4D “Sustaina-
ble Governance of Food Systems”).  
A prominent example of the difficulty to find a balance between trade regulation and sustain-
able development is the case of export restrictions in relation to extractive industries. Under 
certain conditions, the use of measures restricting the exportation of hard commodities may 
alleviate the negative externalities linked to extractive activities by slowing the pace of extrac-
tion and exploitation and, consequently, reducing the rate of depletion of finite resources and 
the detrimental environmental impacts of mining and drilling operations (Fung and Korinek 
2014). Yet, countries purporting to use export restraints to address sustainable development 
concerns often experience an increase in the domestic consumption of the restricted – and 
therefore cheaper (Piermartini 2004) – extractive resources by local downstream industries 
(Fung and Korinek 2014). In these cases, the desired environmental objective is frustrated 
and export restrictions fulfil industrial purposes inasmuch as they de facto subsidize domestic 
downstream producers to the detriment of foreign competitors (Espa 2015). The question 
therefore lies in how to calibrate trade rules in a way that creates a transparent and predicta-
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ble environment, thus preventing beggar-thy-neighbour export restrictions, and still ensures 
that countries maintain sufficient policy space to use export restrictions for sustainable de-
velopment needs under legitimate circumstances (Espa 2015b). Possible avenues for de-
signing more balanced trade disciplines on export restrictions are discussed in Espa (2015b).  
Further studies on innovative, better balanced trade rules with respect to commodity trade 
are needed. Such studies should adequately take into account that, while issues related to 
the soft commodity and the hard commodity sectors may sometimes converge, the very dis-
tinct characteristics of renewable resources and the different modes of production and regu-
lation, particularly regarding agricultural products, may require sector-specific analyses.  
4.5 Knowledge gaps 
A wide range of hard law instruments and soft law initiatives aimed at mitigating and/or pre-
venting the occurrence of negative impacts on human rights and on the environment exist to 
date, which are relevant for commodity investment and trading. Yet, as they do not normally 
address the commodity sector specifically, their impact on the performance of commodity 
corporations has not been consistently and systematically assessed so far. Both country-
specific studies and comprehensive comparative studies evaluating the effectiveness of in-
ternational as well as national instruments are lacking. This holds true for both hard law (e.g. 
MEAs, DTAs,…) and soft law (e.g. IFC Performance Standards, Global Compact, Equator 
Principles,…) mechanisms. Even in those cases where standards are directly conceived for 
the commodity sector or, more precisely, for particular subindustries of the commodity sector, 
the available literature is still mainly concerned with technical and managerial issues and has 
not adequately investigated the linkages between the standards and the sustainability per-
formances of commodity corporations. Finally, the relationship between market-related regu-
lation and sustainable commodity investment and trading is an underexplored field of re-
search. In this respect, there is a need to discuss the role of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and other international investment treaties in promoting responsible investments, to 
assess the impact of speculation in derivatives commodity trading, and to explore avenues 
for making trade rules more conducive to sustainable trade in commodities.  
Conclusion 
Commodity production and trade is high on the political agenda – not least in Switzerland, 
which is a major hub for commodity traders worldwide. The debate centres on costs and 
benefits of the sector, including (reputational) risks, causalities and responsibility chains, data 
availability and transparency, policy coherence for (sustainable) development, and related 
policy options. While the debate has been creating a considerable stir, our review of existing 
academic literature clearly shows that not enough knowledge is available yet. Overall data 
are weak and nexuses as well as relationships unclear. Policy options are only just emerging 
or not yet available. If assessed against the benchmark of sustainable development, com-
parative regulatory analysis is weak, and the effectiveness of already existing standards and 
regulations is not yet established. In view of these gaps, more interdisciplinary and transdis-
ciplinary research efforts – particularly with a link to Switzerland – are needed to advance the 
policy debate. Prospective researchers will need to consider that issues related to soft com-
modities and hard commodities may sometimes converge, but are more often disparate giv-
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en the very distinct characteristics of renewable resources and the different modes of pro-
duction and regulation, particularly regarding agricultural products.  
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Economic data 
Sector / type Import  (weight and value) 
Export 
(weight and 
value) 
Fiscal revenues 
Number of companies and 
employees associated with 
the sector 
Domestic 
consumption Source 
Hard commodities 
Oil 12.43 million tonnes 
(4.89 raw oil and 
7.54 finished prod-
ucts) 
CHF 10.78 billion 
(3.80 raw oil) 
1.14 kilotonnes CHF 6.37 billion 
(sales of raw oil prod-
ucts); corresponds to 
4.7% of federal fiscal 
revenue 
27 companies associated to 
the "Erdöl-Vereinigung" (ac-
count for 95% of imports) 
503,540 TJ (43.8% 
of total energy con-
sumption) 
Erdöl-Vereinigung. 
Jahresbericht 2013. 
Gas 39.8 TWh N.A. N.A. N.A. 40 TWh (13.5% of 
total energy con-
sumption) 
VSG. Erdgas in Zahlen 
2014. 
Coal N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.   
Base metals (iron, alu-
minium, copper, etc.) 
N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.   
Precious metals: Gold 3.1 tonnes 
CHF 109.8 billion 
2.8 tonnes 
CHF 117.7 billion 
N.A. N.A.  Swiss-Impex 2013. 
Precious metals: Silver 1.8 tonnes 
CHF 1.4 billion 
2.4 tonnes 
CHF 1.7 billion  
N.A. N.A.  Swiss-Impex 2013. 
Soft commodities 
Cocoa 40,900 tonnes (co-
coa beans) 
CHF 119 million 
109,662 tonnes 
(processed 
products) 
CHF 792 million 
N.A. 18 members of chocosuisse 
with 4,412 employees 
65,000 tonnes Chocosuisse. Schweizer 
Schokoladenindustrie im 
Jahr 2013; Swiss-Impex 
2013. 
Coffee 131,000 tonnes (not 
roasted coffee) 
CHF 500 million 
131,000 tonnes 
CHF 660 million 
N.A. 60–80 roast houses with 
1,050 employees 
69,399 tonnes 
(CHF 891 million, 
processed prod-
ucts) 
Procafé. Positionspapier: 
Die wirtschaftliche Be-
deutung des Kaffees für 
die Schweiz. 2013. 
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Sugar N.A. 149,875 tonnes N.A. 2 production houses 
(217,155 tonnes sugar pro-
duction) 
3,000 employees 
 Schweizer Zucker AG. 
Statistik. 2013 
Cereals 784,000 tonnes 
CHF 326 million 
17,100 tonnes 
CHF 2.80 million 
N.A. N.A.  Swiss-Impex 2013. 
Cotton (linters) 1.4 kilotonnes 
CHF 2.6 million 
315 kg 
CHF 3,057 
N.A. N.A.  Swiss-Impex 2013. 
Wood N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.   
Selection of relevant economic data for Swiss physical cross-border commodity trade. Data for 2013, different sources. Enumeration not conclusive. (N.A. = not available) 
 
Annex 2: Actors 
Sector / type Organisation name Number of members or affiliated companies Sector Activities 
Lobbying 
Commodity trading 
sector 
Verband Schweizerischer Transit- und 
Welthandelsfirmen 
N.A. N.A. Period of existence: 1934–2003 
Commodity trading 
sector 
Swiss Trading and Shipping Association 
(STSA) 
150 diverse commodity 
companies 
 
Interest group (finance, trading, 
shipping, logistics, transport) 
Representation of commodity trading 
houses’ interests at the national level (re-
gional associations GTSA, LCTA, ZCA). 
Commodity trading 
sector 
Geneva Trading and Shipping Associa-
tion (GTSA)  
N.A. Interest group (finance, trading, 
shipping, logistics, transport) 
Platform for the commodity industry, edu-
cation, training, organization of events, 
networking, lobbying, economic promotion, 
communication 
Commodity trading 
sector 
Lugano Commodity Trading Association 
(LCTA)  
40 Interest group (finance, trading, 
shipping, logistics, transport) 
Platform for the commodity industry, edu-
cation, training, organization of events, 
networking, lobbying, economic promotion, 
communication 
Commodity trading 
sector 
Zug Commodity Association (ZCA)  N.A. Interest group (finance, trading, 
shipping, logistics, transport) 
Platform for the commodity industry, edu-
cation, training, organization of events, 
networking, lobbying, economic promotion, 
communication 
Whole commodity sec-
tor 
Commodity Club – Center of Competence N.A. Networking (trading and finance) Building a network of personal interactions, 
education, exchange and combination of 
know-how, representation of interests, 
information 
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Shipping and transport 
No Cargo Forum Schweiz 6 Interest group for goods 
transport 
Lobbying 
No Swiss Shippers’ Council N.A. Shipping, logistics, transport Lobbying, events, education, training, net-
working 
No SpedLogSwiss – Swiss Freight Forward-
ing and Logistics Association 
> 300 Shipping, logistics, transport Lobbying, events, education, training, net-
working 
Hard commodities 
Oil Erdöl Vereinigung 27 Interest group of importers of 
raw oil and processed oil 
Interest group, lobbying and communica-
tion for the oil economy 
Gas erdgas. Verband der Schweizerischen 
Gasindustrie (VSG)  
92 Interest group of importers of 
natural gas as well as for mar-
keting and heating with gas 
Interest group, lobbying and communica-
tion for the gas economy 
Metals Swissmem 1,018 Interest group of the industry  
Metals Schweizerische Metall-Union 1,800  
(17,000 employees) 
Interest group of the industry  
Metals Verband Schweizer Metall Zulieferer 
(SMZ) 
119 Interest group of the industry  
Gold N.A. N.A. N.A.  
Soft commodities 
Cocoa Chocosuisse – Verband Schweizerischer 
Schokoladefabrikanten 
18  
(4,412 employees) 
Interest group of the chocolate 
industry 
Union of chocolate producers 
Coffee Sucafina  N.A. N.A. Production and marketing of green and 
soluble coffee 
Coffee Schweizerische Kaffeehandler Vereini-
gung – Swiss Coffee Traders Association 
N.A. Interest group of coffee traders Sub-entities of the international coffee 
organization 
Coffee Procafé – Vereinigung zur Förderung von 
Kaffee 
57 Interest group for coffee promo-
tion 
Promotion, education, information, com-
munication 
Sugar Schweizer Zucker AG N.A. Company, production of sugar Only company active in sugar production 
from sugar beet in Switzerland 
Cereal Verband des Schweizerischen Getreide- 
und Futtermittelhandels 
27 Interest group of cereal traders  Import of cereals and animal feed, repre-
sentation of interests 
Textile Swiss Textiles – Textilverband Schweiz 200 Interest group of the textile sec-
tor (including cotton) 
Interest group 
Wood Holzindustrie Schweiz 400 Interest group of the wood indus-
try 
Production, interest group 
Livestock Schweizerischer Viehhändler Verband 
SVV 
900 Interest group of cattle traders Interest group 
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Tobacco Swiss Tobacco – Vereinigung des 
schweizerischen Tabakwarenhandels 
25  
(4,000 employees) 
Interest group of the entire to-
bacco industry, including tobac-
co trade 
Interest group 
Tobacco Swiss Cigarette 3 Interest group tobacco industry 
(cigarette producers) 
Interest group 
Tobacco Verband Schweizerischer Zigarrenfabri-
kanten VSZ 
2 Interest group (cigars producers) Interest group 
Research and Education 
 SEN-Plattform „Nachhaltige Nutzung 
kritischer Rohstoffe“ 
F&E-Konsortium “Sus-
tainable Engineering 
Network Switzerland” 
(SEN) 
Research, project development  Bringing together entrepreneurs and scien-
tists to promote a sustainable and efficient 
use of critical raw materials through pro-
jects and contacts 
 CAS Certificate of Advanced Studies 
Commodity Professional 
Hochschule Luzern – 
Lucerne University of 
Applied Sciences and 
Arts  
Education Education on commodity industry, markets 
and trading for employees and profession-
als  
 DAS Diploma of Advanced Studies in 
Commodity Trading 
University of Geneva Education Education on commodity industry, markets 
and trading for employees and profession-
als 
 Master in International Trading, Commod-
ity Finance and Shipping 
University of Geneva Education Broad business education on commodity 
trading (executive master’s) 
 Executive Master in International Oil and 
Gas Leadership (IOG) 
Graduate Institute Ge-
neva (IHEID) in collabo-
ration with IFP School 
Energies nouvelles 
Education Broad business education on commodity 
trading (executive master’s) 
 Institut Suisse de recherche sur les ma-
tières premières – Swiss Research Insti-
tute on Commodities 
University of Geneva Education and research To be established in 2015 
Swiss-based NGOs 
 Erklärung von Bern  Trade, agriculture and biodiversi-
ty, finance, corporate regulation, 
consumption, human rights 
 
 Nouvelle Planète  Development  
 Multiwatch  Human rights  
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 Brot für alle  Agriculture, climate and devel-
opment, fair trade, human rights 
 
 Alliance Sud  Development issues, commodity 
trade, agriculture, and climate 
 
Selection of relevant Swiss actors active in the commodity sector. The list is not exhaustive. 
 
Annex 3: Political Initiatives 
Political initiatives 
Swiss Parliament 
Submission 
Date Title 
Type and Classification 
Number Party Status and Federal Council stance 
15.04.2013 Aufsichtsbehörde für den Handel mit Rohstoffen und Nah-
rungsmitteln 
Postulate 13.3288 Green Party Not yet taken up in plenary – Federal Council 
proposes to reject it 
16.04.2013 Rohstoffabbau und -handel. Korruption und Steuerbefrei-
ung von Unternehmen bekämpfen 
Interpellation 13.3307 Green Party Not yet taken up in plenary – Answer from 
Federal Council with references to Back-
ground Report 
12.06.2013 Aktionsplan Transparenz im Rohstoffhandel Interpellation 13.3422 Christian Demo-
crat/EPP group 
Not yet taken up in plenary – Federal Council 
proposes to reject it 
12.06.2013 Rohstoffbericht. Unternehmensverantwortung als freiwillige 
Selbstbindung oder verbindliche Vorschrift 
Interpellation 13.3423 Christian Demo-
crat/EPP group 
Not yet taken up in plenary – Answer from 
Federal Council with references to EITI and 
CSR 
17.04.2013 Steueraufkommen und Steuerregimes der Rohstoffhan-
delsfirmen in der Schweiz 
Interpellation 13.3309 Socialist Party Not yet taken up in plenary – Answer from 
Federal Council with references to Back-
ground Report 
29.04.2013 Mehr Transparenz im Schweizer Rohstoffsektor Postulate 13.3365 Foreign Affairs 
Committees (FAC) 
Approved – Federal Council proposes to 
accept it  
19.03.2014 Zusammenarbeit von Schweizer Rohstofffirmen mit der 
peruanischen Nationalpolizei 
Interpellation 14.3146 Social Democratic 
Party 
Not yet taken up in plenary – Answer from 
Federal Council on 21.05.2014 
21.03.2014 Internationales Rohstoffabkommen. Rolle der Schweiz in 
den Verhandlungen 
Interpellation 14.3256 Green-Liberal Party Not yet taken up in plenary – Answer from 
Federal Council with references to Back-
ground Report and Action-plan Green Econ-
omy 
20.06.2014 Transparenzlücke im Rohstoffhandel rasch schliessen Interpellation 14.3595  Social Democratic 
Party 
Answered by Federal Council  
01.09.2014 Umsetzung des rechtsvergleichenden Berichtes des Bun-
desrates über die Verantwortung von Unternehmen bezüg-
Motion 14.3671 Foreign Affairs 
Committees (FAC) 
Rejected – Federal Council proposes to re-
ject it 
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lich Menschenrechten und Umwelt (12.3980) 
25.09.2014 Massnahmen gegen den „Rohstoff-Fluch“ Postulate 14.3897 Social Democratic 
Party 
Not yet taken up in plenary – Federal Council 
proposes to reject it 
10.12.2014 Glencore Xstrata. Ölbohrungen im von Marokko besetzten 
Gebiet der Westsahara 
Interpellation 14.4148  Social Democratic 
Party 
Answered by Federal Council 
12.12.2014 Blutgold aus Burkina Faso bei Metalor in der Schweiz? Interpellation 14.4238 Social Democratic 
Party 
Answered by Federal Council 
19.03.2015 Nationales Forschungsprogramm zur Rolle der Schweiz bei 
der Abwicklung unlauterer und unrechtmässiger Finanz-
flüsse 
Motion 15.3266 Social Democratic 
Party 
Not yet taken up in plenary 
Swiss Federal Council and Swiss Administration 
Submission 
Date Title    
27.03.2013 Background Report: Commodities  Federal Council 
affair 
 
26.03.2014 Background report on commodities: Status report on the 
implementation of recommendations. 
 Federal Council 
affair 
 
08.03.2013 Report to the Federal Council “Green Economy: Report 
and Action Plan” 
 Federal Council 
affair 
 
2.05.2014 Rechtsvergleichender Bericht – Sorgfaltsprüfung bezüglich 
Menschenrechten und Umwelt im Zusammenhang mit den 
Auslandaktivitäten von Schweizer Konzernen. Bericht in 
Erfüllung des Postulates 12.3980.  
 -  
16.05.2014 Bericht in Erfüllung der Empfehlung 8 des Grundlagenbe-
richts Rohstoffe und des Postulats 13.3365 „Mehr Transpa-
renz im Schweizer Rohstoffsektor“ 
 Federal Council 
affair 
 
3.09.2014 Botschaft zum Finanzmarktinfrastrukturgesetz (FinfraG)  Federal Council 
affair 
 
28.11.2014 Revision des Aktienrechts – Vorentwurf geschickt in die 
Vernehmlassung  
 Federal Council 
affair 
 
1.04.2015 Positionspapier und Aktionsplan des Bundesrates zur Ver-
antwortung der Unternehmen für Gesellschaft und Umwelt 
 Federal Council 
affair 
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Civil Society – Popular Initiatives 
Signatures 
collection 
begin 
Title  Submitted by Status and Federal Council stance 
08.03.2011 Popular initiative: Grüne Wirtschaft 
Eidgenössische Volksinitiative 'Für eine nachhaltige und 
ressourceneffiziente Wirtschaft' 
 Green Party Federal Council through the message of 
12.02.2014 recommends rejecting the initia-
tive and proposes a direct counter-proposal 
with an amendment of the “Federal Act on the 
Protection of the Environment”. 
25.09.2012 Popular initiative: Nahrungsmitteliniative 
Eidgenössische Volksinitiative 'Keine Spekulation mit 
Nahrungsmitteln!' 
 JUSO Schweiz Federal Council through the message of 
18.02.2015 recommends rejecting the initia-
tive. The Federal council is proposing an 
Amendment of the Financial Markets Law in 
the Parliament in order to regulate the specu-
lation in agricultural commodities. 
21.04.2015 Popular initiative: Konzernverantwortungsinitiative: 
Eidgenössische Volksinitiative 'Für verantwortungsvolle 
Unternehmen – zum Schutz von Mensch und Umwelt' 
 66 NGOs Signatures’ collection deadline: 21.10.2016. 
Selection of political initiatives concerning the commodity sector by the Swiss Parliament, the Federal Council, and the Federal Administration. Enumeration is not conclusive. The 
list includes initiatives launched as of 2013 that are strictly related to commodities (search criteria: “Rohstoff, Rohstoffe, Gold, Öl”) other related political initiatives may be missing. 
Section 1.2.4 provides an analysis of the commodity related political agenda. Sources: Websites of the Swiss Parliament (www.parlament.ch) and the Federal Authorities 
(www.admin.ch). Accessed: 04.02.2015. 
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Annex 4:  Literature on local impacts of hard and soft commodities 
on livelihoods, the environment, and governance in 
developing countries 
 
This annex explains how the literature for Section 3 was selected.  
First we defined eight soft and seven hard commodities according to their developmental and economic relevance for Switzer-
land. 
Relevance of commodities for Switzerland 
Commodity 
group Commodity Developmental relevance  Economic relevance 
Hard 
Mineral commodities (copper, aluminium, iron) X X 
Energy commodities (oil, gas, coal) X X 
Precious metals (gold) X X 
Soft 
Cocoa, coffee, sugar X X 
Soy X X 
Timber X ? 
Cotton X ? 
Palm oil X X 
Rubber X ? 
 
For each commodity, only those papers reporting on impacts on the local scale were considered.  
Next, we developed a list of keywords for literature research and analysis of a case study. These keywords covered three im-
pact dimensions: the socio-economic, the environmental, and the governance dimension. 
 
Impact  
dimensions Keywords Description, area of impact 
Spatial focus  Geographic context Country 
Local scale 
Focus of study, e.g. village, community, municipality, settlement, 
farm, mining town, city area, mining site/area, project, field, lake, river 
basin, dam area, study sites, ethnic group 
Socio-economic  
impacts: livelihoods Nutrition 
Dietary use of natural resources, quality of natural resources which 
serve as a source of nutrition/alimentation 
Subsistence Use of commodities for self-sufficiency 
Social behaviour patterns e.g. violation, resentment, envy, fear, suicide 
Internal and external group 
relationships 
Regional relationships in and between communities (e.g. commodity 
production leading to social tensions between groups) 
Community coherence 
Position and local attitude towards resource extraction and operating 
corporations: homogenous (cohesion) vs. heterogeneous, initiatives, 
resistance vs. acceptance, social mobilization 
Repression (towards commu-
nity) 
Presence of state and corporation: military/police presence (e.g. 
where armed resistance to the government already exists, pri-
vate/state police), coercive actions towards local population 
Employment Job creation, quantity of employment opportunities (e.g. transfor-
mation from subsistence to plantation work, pastoralism), contract 
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work 
Working conditions 
Quality of employment opportunities: minimum wages, labour rights 
such as free association of workers (unions), health and safety in the 
workplace, illegal work 
Gender Differences in access to employment, income, roles 
Land Commodification, land tenure (e.g. shift from communal ownership to individual ownership), land shortage 
Land rights Ownership (e.g. loss of rights) 
Displacement Freedom of movement, resettlement/allocation of communities 
Rights Rights of local populations in general, local knowledge about rights and opportunities vis-à-vis corporations and state 
Training Training in production/extraction practices, knowledge/information about farming system 
Traditional lifestyle/culture  Respect for tradition, beliefs, ceremonies, customs, stories, language, traditional activities such as hunting, fishing, gathering 
Worldview 
Understanding/perception of world/life (e.g. meaning of commodities, 
understanding of production/extraction), meaning and relationship to 
land 
Traditional practice Traditional processing/traditional use of commodities 
Income  
Levels of income/wage, difference of local income between traditional 
and resource industry, source and use of financial opportunities and 
resources  
Socio-economic differentia-
tion  
Disparate wealth/inequalities (measurement e.g. using gini coeffi-
cient/index) 
Certification Certification criteria, e.g. fair trade, organic 
Genetic (soft commodities) Genetically modified commodity, e.g. Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton in India 
Infrastructure (hard commodi-
ties: provided by corporations;  
soft commodities: provided by 
state for production) 
Provided by mining corporations (e.g. health care, education, 
transport, housing, roads, power/electricity) 
Development programmes (of 
corporations) 
Employment and training opportunities (e.g. community development 
employment programme, educational programmes, alcohol interven-
tions) 
Demographic 
change/transition 
e.g. increase of population/male workers due to labour migration, out-
migration of young people 
Ethnic change e.g. influx of non-indigenous people/Europeans into the region due to labour migration 
Environmental 
impacts Water  
Availability and quality of water (e.g. regional water shortages and 
decline of water quality), groundwater, surface water, drinking water, 
irrigation 
Soil (land) Availability and quality of land/soil (e.g. decline of soil fertility, degra-dation of arable land) 
Forests Existence of forest areas, type of forests (e.g. reduction of forest areas, forest resources) 
Air (atmosphere) e.g. pollution near mining areas, greenhouse gas emissions, aerial carbon contribution 
Biodiversity  e.g. loss/conservation of natural habitats and genetic resources, ecosystem services, species variation 
Governance im-
pacts 
Existing and governmental 
mechanisms 
Impacts of national laws and agreements between local (and nation-
al) stakeholders  
Governmental programmes Supporting local population in commodity production/extraction 
Tax Fiscal revenues for (local) governments and business groups and civil society organizations 
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Governmental policies Impacts of policies regarding commodity production/extraction 
Voluntary guidelines/CSR Impacts of CSR policies, FPIC, voluntary guidelines 
Existing local collaboration Collaboration between local population and other stakeholders, e.g. extension agents, middlemen 
 
Subsequently, an overview of the keywords and the number of papers found corresponding to these impacts was compiled for 
both soft and hard commodities (see graphs at this end of this Annex). Literature was examined via metasearch. This enabled 
searching by combinations of a commodity and one or several keywords as subjects. Databases primarily used included Web of 
Science and ScienceDirect. We looked for journal articles published in the last 20 years (since 1995), while giving priority to the 
most recent publications. A paper was considered relevant for the study if the required commodity was mentioned in its title, 
keywords, or abstract. If the search by commodity resulted in a relatively low number of papers, it was then complemented with 
some book sections. 
In the first step of this research process, 500 articles were imported into the database. In the second step, the papers were 
reviewed regarding the geographical scale of the study area in order to ensure that reported impacts really referred to the local 
level. The local scale included records such as villages, communities, municipalities, settlements, farms, mining towns, city 
areas, mining sites or areas, plantation fields, lakes, river basins, and dam areas. At the same time, the list of keywords was 
related to the three impact dimensions covered by this section. Keywords were assigned based on the abstract and the conclu-
sion of the imported articles. A paper was excluded if its research setting was not local or if its abstract and conclusion con-
tained no relevant information. After this step, 260 articles remained in the reference managing software database. Given that 
some articles address more than one commodity or more than one country, the total number of articles does not match the total 
number of commodities discussed in the papers.  
In a subsequent step, the keywords given to each paper were evaluated: the impacts discussed were assessed as being either 
positive or negative based on the article’s conclusion. If an impact consisted of both positive and negative effects, it was consid-
ered controversial. An impact was considered neutral if it had no effect at all on the local level.  
Quantitative data were reproduced and presented in a table according to the classification and assessment criteria defined 
above. These data were then discussed as costs and benefits presenting the picture emerging from the literature found. 
Soft commodities 
Number of papers addressing local impacts of soft commodities in the livelihood, environmental, and governance 
dimensions 
 
Local impacts 
Non-food commodities Food commodities 
Rubber Palm oil Cotton Timber Soy Sugar Cocoa Coffee 
Total 29 29 7 12 7 2 32 41 
Livelihood Dimension 22 21 5 10 5 1 19 25 
Income 14 17 1 9 3 0 13 21 
Employment 6 10 1 2 0 1 3 3 
Socio-economic differentiation 2 3 2 0 2 0 2 3 
Land rights/ tenure/access 2 7 0 3 3 0 4 4 
Displacement 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 
Environmental Dimension 13 12 0 2 5 1 19 21 
Water 0 2 0 0 2 1 3 4 
Soil 3 5 0 0 1 1 8 10 
Forest 8 7 0 2 3 0 7 7 
Biodiversity 3 5 0 0 0 0 12 12 
Air 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Governance Dimension 8 10 1 8 4 0 1 5 
Taxes 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 
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Government policies 8 6 1 6 3 0 1 3 
Government mechanisms 3 4 0 3 2 0 0 4 
Certification  2 3 2 0 3 0 1 11 
Hybrids  0 1 5 0 0 0 3 1 
 
 
Number of papers discussing geographical context of local impacts of soft commodities 
 
Geograph-
ical context 
Non-food commodities Food commodities 
Rubber Palm oil Cotton Timber Soy Sugar Cocoa Coffee 
Africa 
 
 
 
CMR – 2 
GHA – 1 
 
BEN – 1 
GHA – 1 
 
MLI – 2 GHA – 1 
 
  GHA – 9 
CMR – 6 
NGA – 3 
CIV – 2 
KEN – 2 
ETH – 1 
UGA – 1 
 
Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
IDN – 9 
CHN – 7 
LAO – 5 
LKA – 2 
MYS – 1 
 
IND – 11 
MYS – 9 
PNG – 2 
PHL – 1 
SLB – 1 
THA – 1 
IND – 4 
CHN – 1 
IDN – 2 
PAK – 1 
PNG – 1 
PHL – 1 
 
 
  IDN – 5 
VNM – 1 
IDN – 4 
IND – 2 
LAO – 1 
PNG – 1 
VNM – 5 
 
America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BRA – 4 
 
BRA – 1 
CRI – 1 
 BRA – 3 
BOL – 1 
PAN – 1 
 
 
 
BRA – 5 
ARG –1 
ECU – 1 
PRY – 1 
 
ECU – 1 
MEX – 1 
BLZ – 1 
BRA – 1 
COL – 1 
ECU – 1 
PAN – 1 
PER – 1 
MEX – 9 
GTM – 6 
SLV – 4 
NIC – 3 
BRA – 2 
CRI – 2 
COL – 1 
ECU – 1 
HND – 1 
Total countries 8 10 3 8 4 2 12 17 
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Hard Commodities 
Number of papers addressing local impacts of hard commodities in the livelihood, environmental, and governance 
dimensions 
 
Local impacts 
Minerals Energy Precious 
Alumini-
um Copper Iron ore Coal Crude oil Gas Gold 
Total 1 13 8 13 2 1 79 
Livelihood Dimension 1 6 3 7 0 0 39 
Income 1 0 1 6 0 0 16 
Employment 0 1 3 7 0 0 18 
Socio-economic differentia-
tion 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Working conditions 0 1 0 2 0 0 5 
Land rights/ tenure/access 1 3 2 0 0 0 11 
Displacement 1 0 0 1 0 0 8 
Environmental Dimension 0 6 5 5 2 2 46 
Water 0 5 2 3 0 0 35 
Soil 0 3 2 4 2 0 20 
Forest 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Biodiversity 0 2 1 4 0 0 2 
Air 0 1 2 2 0 1 9 
Governance Dimension 0 3 1 5 0 0 21 
Taxes 0 1 0 2 0 0 4 
Government policies 0 2 1 2 0 0 6 
Government mechanisms 0 1 0 4 0 0 3 
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Number of papers discussing geographical context of local impacts of hard commodities 
 
Geographical context  
Minerals Energy Precious 
Alumini-
um Copper Iron ore Coal Crude oil Gas Gold 
Africa  
 
ZMB – 5 
DRC – 2 
ZAF – 1 ZAF – 3 
 
NGA – 2 
 
DZA – 1 
 
GHA – 25 
TZA – 7 
ZAF – 5 
ZWE – 3 
ETH – 1 
GUF – 1 
KEN – 1 
MLI – 1 
MOZ –1 
SUR – 1 
Asia 
 
 
 
LAO – 1 
 
PNG – 3 
MEX – 1 
IRN – 1 
IND – 5 
IRN – 1 
 
CHN – 6 
IND – 2 
MYS – 1 
 
  IDN – 3 
PHL – 3 
CHN – 1 
IRN – 1 
KGZ – 1 
SAU – 1 
America  
 
CHL – 1 
PER – 1 
ECU – 1 
BRA – 1 BRA – 1 
 
  PER – 8 
ECU – 4 
GTM – 3 
ARG – 1 
BRA – 1 
CHL – 1 
VEN – 1 
Total countries  1 8 4 5 1 1 23 
 
 
 
Key to country abbreviations 
ARG:  Argentina 
BEN:  Republic of Benin 
BLZ:  Belize 
BOL:  Bolivia 
BRA:  Brazil 
CHL:  Chile 
CHN:  China 
CIV:  Côte d´Ivoire 
CMR:  Cameroon 
COL:  Colombia 
CRI:  Costa Rica 
DRC:  Democratic Republic of the Congo 
DZA:  Algeria 
ECU:  Ecuador 
ETH:  Ethiopia 
GHA:  Ghana 
GTM:  Guatemala 
GUF:  French Guiana 
HND:  Honduras 
IDN:  Indonesia 
IND:  India 
IRN:  Iran 
KEN:  Kenya 
KGZ:  Kyrgyz Republic 
LAO:  Lao PDR 
LKA:  Sri Lanka  
MEX:  Mexico 
MLI:  Mali 
MOZ:  Mozambique 
MYS:  Malaysia 
NGA:  Nigeria 
NIC:  Nicaragua 
PAK:  Pakistan 
PAN:  Panama 
PER:  Peru 
PHL:  Philippines 
PNG:  Papua New Guinea 
PRY:  Paraguay 
UGA:  Uganda 
SAU:  Saudi Arabia  
SLB:  Solomon Islands 
SLV:  El Salvador 
SUR:  Suriname 
THA:  Thailand 
TZA:  Tanzania 
VEN:  Venezuela 
VNM:  Vietnam 
ZAF:  South Africa 
ZMB:  Zambia 
ZWE:  Zimbabwe 
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